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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this applied study was to solve the problem of adequately providing guidance to
support staff in the recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to
the community, self, or others at John Doe High School located in southeast Virginia and to
design practices to train all students, faculty, and staff to address the problem. A multimethod
design was used consisting of both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The first approach
was semi-structured interviews with members of the school-based threat assessment team. The
second approach was conducting a focus group with support staff. The third approach led to the
development of a brief online training module followed by a post-training survey to measure
perceptions of effectiveness. Based on findings identified during interviews, the focus group,
and quantitative survey data several recommendations for implementing an initiative to improve
recognizing threatening or aberrant behavior were developed that is consistent with the Virginia
Department of Criminal Justice Services’ Threat Assessment Model Policies. This initiative
included developing a hybrid training approach that includes virtual micro lessons and in-person
training for support staff and increasing the communication of threat assessment awareness to the
entire school community to increase the capacity to recognize and report threatening or aberrant
behavior.
Keywords: aberrant behavior, school shootings, social bonds, social control theory,
targeted violence, threat assessment, support staff, professional development
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Overview
The purpose of this applied study was to solve the problem of inadequately trained
support staff in the recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to
the community, self, or others at John Doe High School (JDHS) located in southeast Virginia by
developing and implementing online training modules. The problem was that John Doe High
School is not adequately providing guidance and training to support staff in the recognition of
threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to the community, self, or others. A
multimethod design will be used consisting of qualitative and quantitative approaches to address
this problem.
Chapter one provides the foundation of factors that led to the integration of threat
assessment in the school community at both the national and Commonwealth of Virginia level.
This not only includes the historical events, but the policies and legislation that led to change
specific to Virginia. Of particular interest to this problem of practice is the framework of social
control theory and social bond theory and how they explain certain behaviors that relate to threat
assessment and recognition of aberrant behavior. Additionally, adult learning theories will be
examined as they relate to the development of online training. The accompanying literature and
research will be used to develop solutions for addressing the problem of this study and increase
threat assessment guidance and awareness through an online training module.
Targeted violence in schools is a major concern and topic of discussion among law
enforcement, school personnel, politicians, parents, students and the media in order to keep
students and faculty safe (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2018). There has been
increased concern for the safety of students and staff related to the prevention of targeted
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violence. Many local agencies have responded by hiring school security officers, utilizing
school resource officers, locking doors, installing entry access systems, and/or increasing
training related to threat assessment (National Center for Education Statistics [NCES], 2018).
Preventive measures to address school safety may reduce or mitigate potential targeted
violence and increase options available to school administrators and law enforcement to confront
minor problems before it escalates (Center for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2017).
Preventative measures may also serve as a deterrent to individuals who may be on the pathway to
violence (Pollard, Nolan, & Deisinger, 2012).
All Virginia public K-12 schools and institutions of higher education are legislatively
mandated to have behavioral threat assessment teams for the purpose of recognizing threatening
or aberrant behavior of individuals that may pose a threat to self or others (Virginia Department
of Criminal Justice Services [DCJS], 2020). The use of behavioral threat assessment teams for
the purpose of managing threats to self and others provides a proactive approach to managing
risk. Threat assessment teams are required to provide guidance to school staff and students on
how to recognize threats and aberrant behavior. However, individuals outside of the schoolbased threat assessment team may be unaware of the threat assessment process, how to recognize
aberrant behavior, and any reporting mechanisms that may be in place.
Background
In April 1999, Columbine High School in Colorado captured the nation’s attention when
two students began shooting students and staff. This resulted in 13 fatalities, several injuries,
and untold trauma as a result of this horrifying experience. Although Columbine was not the
first school shooting, it was seen as a critical moment when schools, law enforcement, and policy
makers began making systemic institutional changes. Shortly following the Columbine shooting
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the United States Secret Service (USSS) and the United States Department of Education
(USDOE) collaborated to further understand the profile of a school shooter and find ways to
prevent these violent attacks (Vossekuil et al., 2004). As a result, the Safe School Initiative was
developed based on a threat assessment model employed by the USSS. This framework served
to answer the questions of whether an attack was being planned and if it could be prevented.
This inquiry resulted in a “federal model of school threat assessment” to identify and manage
threats of violence (Modzeleski & Randazzo, 2018, p. 110).
Threat assessment is a preventative measure to identify aberrant, or concerning, behavior
by an individual (DCJS, 2020). A threat assessment team is a multidisciplinary group of
individuals tasked with evaluating whether an individual is on the pathway to violence. This
pathway for an individual consists of ideation, planning, preparation, and attack (Federal Bureau
of Investigation (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2017, p. 24). The goal of threat
assessment is to identify the individual(s) of concern, determine if they are on the pathway to
violence, and remove them from that pathway prior to an act of violence. As a part of case
management, the team typically provides support service to address any mental health needs and
certainly in some situations there may be school based consequences and/or criminal
prosecution. These teams, however, are only effective if the staff and students in a school are
aware of the threat assessment process, can recognize aberrant behavior, and know how to report
a threat to the appropriate person.
The Commonwealth of Virginia legislatively requires all institutions of higher education
and public K-12 schools to have behavioral threat assessment teams (Threat Assessment Teams
and Oversight Committees, 2016). Despite this legislative mandate, however, there is no
requirement that threat assessment teams be trained, only that their practices are consistent with
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the Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) Model Polices and Guidelines (DCJS,
2020).
Historical Events Impacting Virginia Legislation
While school shootings seem to be a frequent topic in mainstream and social media, this
is not a new event. The first documented school shooting in America was July 26, 1764 in
Pennsylvania ("History of School Shootings," n.d.). However, other school shootings after this
incident have been largely unknown until the Columbine school shooting in 1999. While
Columbine was not the first, it was the event that led to significant changes in school safety
practices and the implementation of behavioral threat assessment teams in a school setting
(O’Toole, 1999). Additionally, the “Secret Service in collaboration with the U.S. Department of
Education reviewed 37 incidents of targeted school violence” (Katsiyannis, Whitford, & Ennis,
2018, p. 2564). This led to the establishment of behavioral threat assessment teams in schools
and institutions of higher education before legislation was written and passed into law. Another
challenge to school safety data was the varied definition of how a mass shooting is described by
the literature. This was complicated because many mass shootings were a familicide (murder of
multiple close family members in close succession) or a byproduct of a robbery or other criminal
activity. However, they were being counted statistically in some instances as a mass shooting or
active shooter incident (Jonson, 2017).
The shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in 2013 resulted in significant policy
changes at the federal level and within the Commonwealth of Virginia. Stakeholders from law
enforcement, education, mental health agencies, and policy makers were looking for a solution in
response to what many parents viewed as a systemic problem of school violence. This ultimately
led to an executive order by President Obama that allocated funding through grants to improve
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school safety measures (Katsiyannis et al., 2018). There was also a focus on gun control and
mental health by implementing preventative strategies in schools (Call for Action, 2018).
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. On April 16, 2007, an armed
student murdered 32 students and staff at Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, Virginia before taking his
life. Following this act of targeted violence, an investigation revealed that the shooter
demonstrated observable aberrant behavior that was witnessed by the school community (Flynn
& Heitzmann, 2008). The shooter had made statements while in high school that referenced
repeating the shooting at Columbine High School and demonstrated withdrawn behavior and
isolation. However, there was no mechanism in place to share these concerns with Virginia Tech
(Flynn & Heitzmann, 2008). At that time there were no requirements for institutions of higher
education or K-12 to establish threat assessment teams.
This Virginia Tech Massacre directly led to proposed legislation in an effort to mandate
that all institutions of higher education have threat assessment teams. In 2008, the Virginia
General Assembly proposed and passed House Bill 1449 which led to changing Virginia Code in
to mandate that every institution of higher education establish threat assessment teams (Violence
Prevention Committee; Threat Assessment Teams, 2008).
Sandy Hook. In December 2012, a non-student adult entered Sandy Hook Elementary
School in Newtown, Connecticut and murdered 20 students and six staff members. Former
Governor McAuliffe established the Virginia Children’s Cabinet to identify strategies and best
practices that could mitigate or prevent an act of targeted violence. Since Virginia had
established behavioral threat assessment teams for institutions of higher education it was a
natural transition to incorporate them in K-12 public schools. As a result, the Commonwealth of
Virginia became the first state in the nation to legislatively require every K-12 public school to
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have behavioral threat assessment teams. Initially, the legislation required threat assessment
teams to manage threats to self or others by students. However, in 2016 the legislation was
amended to change the language that was specific to assessing “students” to “individuals.” It
was recognized that threats are not unique to students and may include parents, former students,
staff, and individuals with no affiliation to the school.
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. On February 14, 2018, a former student
entered Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School on Parkland, Florida and killed 17 students and
staff. There were several factors that in hindsight indicated this individual was on the pathway to
violence, from local and federal law enforcement, and members from the community. Based on
a search of the shooter’s cell phone and internet searches he identified as someone with an
expressed perceived grievance and had been acquiring weapons and tactical gear (Camp,
Massucci, & Suess, 2018). He had made several comments on various social media platforms
that indicated a capacity for violence. However, all of these indicators were isolated as they
existed in various domains (Camp et al., 2018). Unfortunately, there was no central
clearinghouse to further investigate these concerns and to assess if there was cause for
intervention.
At the time of the shooting in Parkland, Virginia was the only the state with mandated K12 threat assessment teams. Since that time Maryland and Florida have passed legislation based
on Virginia’s legislation and several other states have consulted with the Virginia DCJS to
explore developing similar policies and legislation (DCJS, 2020). The Virginia DCJS was
awarded a Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) grant to increase the number of K-12 threat
assessment training, update the curriculum, and develop specific applied modules to better assess
and manage cases.
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Policies and legislation
Historically, the tragedies at Columbine High School, Virginia Tech, Sandy Hook
Elementary School, and Stoneman Douglas High School not only resulted in significant loss of
life but translated into significant policy and legislative changes (Schildkraut & Hernandez,
2013). In some cases, changes were aimed at prevention with a greater degree of government
accountability through changes to gun control policies, prevention strategies, and increased
responses to mental health needs. After the Columbine mass attack politicians in Colorado
created significant changes to policies, legislation, and threat assessment practices (DiRenzo,
2016). They created a robust state school safety center and have made efforts to continue to
examine school safety within the context of research and practical changes to practice (Colorado
School Safety Resource Center, n.d.). Despite what school divisions have implemented,
Colorado legislators passed the Claire Davis School Safety Act in 2015 (DiRenzo, 2016). This
bill allows families of victims to file civil suits against the government in the event an act of
violence is carried out (DiRenzo, 2016).
One challenge of legislation imposed on school divisions is they are often unfunded
mandates. Lawmakers must consider “legislation aimed at increasing school safety” and “focus
on resource officer programs and individual school safety plans” (Elliott, 2015, p. 525). While
these are worthy programs, it can be expensive to implement and could redirect funding that is
allocated to other programs that are needed.
Social Context
The interest in school safety from the individual school building to the federal
government has had a significant amount of attention. The response by the federal and local
government, school boards, and the Commonwealth of Virginia would suggest that school
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shootings have increased dramatically (Temkin et al., 2020). The data does not support a
significant increase in school shootings. However, there has been a significant response (Center
for Homeland Defense & Security [CHDS], 2019). In 1986 there were 76 fatalities and injuries
as a result of a school shooting, while 2018 was slightly higher with 82; including the death of
the shooter (CHDS, 2019). There were far more fatalities and injuries in schools during the
1990s compared to the 2000s (CHDS, 2019). There is no question school shootings have
garnered significant attention on all media platforms and created a demand for improved school
safety (Ogle, Eckman, & Leslie, 2003). The advent of social media during the two decades,
compared to only print, radio, and television, has likely provided greater reach to the masses
(Ogle et al., 2003). Furthermore, social media creates a platform where anyone with an account
can become a “reporter” and share news stories to a much larger audience and with greater
frequency. Whether the information is accurate or provided within the appropriate context is not
necessary to disseminate the story. This may lead to inaccuracies that drive fear and responses
not based on best practice. The media paradox described by John Ruscio (2000) finds that
“events must be somewhat unusual in order to be considered newsworthy, but the very fact of
their appearance in the news leads us to overestimate their frequency of occurrence” (Ruscio,
2000, p. 24).
The fascination with firearms in the United States is often a frequent discussion by
mental health professionals, politicians, and citizens (Cukier & Eagen, 2018). Despite legislative
requirements to bar individuals with criminal history and/or mental health issues from
purchasing or owning firearms it does not seem to prevent mass shootings from occurring
(Bramble, 2014). Some see the increased frequency of mass shootings to be a byproduct of a
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failed mental health system and lead to some individuals attempting to gain access to firearms to
protect themselves from those who mean harm (Bramble, 2014).
Training
While Virginia requires all K-12 public schools to have threat assessment teams there is
no legislative requirement that teams receive formal training. The 2017 Virginia School Safety
Audit Survey Results indicated that 7,439 teachers serve on threat assessment teams, however,
only 36% received training (p. 11). Research conducted where pre-testing was compared to
post-testing after receiving threat assessment training indicated “substantial changes in their
knowledge and attitudes regarding school violence” (Allen, Cornell, Lorek, & Sheras, 2008, p.
329). Of course, this does not include training of support staff and it would not be typical for
them to serve on a threat assessment team. Currently, there is no indication support staff receive
any training on recognizing aberrant behavior or local reporting processes (Cornell et al., 2018).
Theoretical Context
The application of Hirschi’s Social Bond theory in conjunction with identifying the
school climate and the use of the threat assessment team could have the potential to prevent
and/or mitigate acts of violence (Cornell et al., 2018). Findings from the School Safety Initiative
found that most school shooters have a grievance, or perceived grievance, towards others and it
may be a motivating factor towards some act of violence (Vossekuil, Fein, Reddy, Borum, &
Modzeleski, 2002). Attachment to school is one of the cornerstones of a positive authoritative
school climate (Cornell & Huang, 2016). Researchers suggest there is not only a benefit to
increase the opportunities for connectiveness in school, but to also provide student support
(Cornell et al., 2018; Cornell & Huang, 2016). In the context of threat assessment there would
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be opportunities to identify students that may not feel connected to the school, or within their
community and provide support and interventions.
To some extent, schools are tasked with modeling appropriate behavior that will lead to
becoming productive citizens. This is frequently done through a combination of teaching rules
and redirecting as needed. These rules are often written in the Student Code of Conduct and
many are supported by school board policies. Many of these rules not only conform with the
expectations of a school, but also follow local and state law. There are certainly some students
that not only reject the school rules but can become a threat to the school community. One of the
functions of a threat assessment team is to identify when a student is on the pathway to violence
and intervene to mitigate possible risk (DCJS, 2020).
Furthermore, social control theory suggests that individuals are “inherently inclined to be
deviant” and that “it is the mechanisms that inhibit individuals from yielding to their deviant
inclinations” (Peguero, Popp, Latimore, Shekarkhar, & Koo, 2011, p. 260). The application of
social control theory in school shootings, and not just deviant behavior or school violence,
became prevalent following the Columbine Shooting (Pittaro, 2007). Prior to the tragedy at
Columbine, there was very little empirical research devoted specifically to school shootings and
the perpetrators (Pittaro, 2007). To some extent juvenile deviant behavior was primarily seen as
a byproduct of lower socioeconomic status. An accurate profile of a school shooter, or active
shooter in general, does not exist. Many school shooters did not align with the typical
characteristics associated with juvenile delinquent behavior (Silver, Simons, & Craun, 2018). It
goes on to propose that individuals with “weak or broken social bonds to conventional
institutions are more likely to engage in criminal behavior” (Peguero et al., 2011, p. 260).
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Social control theories address why people follow the rules. When individuals do not
follow society’s rules, or school rules, then the theory suggests that there is a weak bond between
the individual and some aspect of society (Pittaro, 2007). While there are many defined social
control theories, the most relevant to juvenile delinquency and the scope of this study is social
bond theory. Hirschi proposes that a juvenile is “less likely to engage in acts of delinquency if
there is a strong attachment to family, school, and the community” (Pittaro, 2007, p. 6). There
are four components required to maintain a social bond, which are attachment, belief,
commitment, and involvement (Hirschi, 2002). According to Pittaro (2007), two shooters in the
Columbine incident lacked attachment to school, which he considers the most important of the
four components of social bond theory that must be in place. Attachment, or the lack thereof,
can impact an “individual’s sensitivity and empathy for the feelings of others” (Pittaro, 2007, p.
6).
Problem Statement
The problem was John Doe High School is not adequately providing guidance and
training to support staff in the recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent
a threat to the community, self, or others. According to the findings of the Virginia Secondary
School Climate Survey (2018) and the school safety survey most teachers are not aware that a
threat assessment process is in place at their school. This has been particularly problematic
considering threat assessment teams are required to “provide guidance to students, faculty, and
staff regarding recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to the
community, school, or self (DCJS, 2020, p. 7). There has been no training for the recognition of
aberrant behavior and behavioral threat assessment specific to the role of support staff in
Virginia. However, support staff often have increased opportunity to witness behavior compared
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to administrators and teachers. Bus drivers are the first and last school-based contact each day.
Custodial staff are familiar with the entire building and often observe behaviors in the hallway,
restrooms, and cafeteria. Front office staff regularly interact with parents, guardians, and other
visitors to the school. School security officers respond to violations of the student code of
conduct and monitor the school building entrance. All of these individuals have the potential to
observe, report, and intervene, which may mitigate or prevent an act of targeted violence.
For threat assessment to be effective it requires a positive school climate where trust and
connectedness are promoted and “training in early risk factors and warning signs” are “offered to
students and school staff members, as they are often the first to become aware of a concern”
(Reeves & Brock, 2017, p. 150). Many individuals that are on the pathway to violence
demonstrate warning behavior well before an act of violence occurs, which will likely be
observed by other students and/or school staff (Meloy, Mohandie, Knoll, & Hoffmann, 2015).
Providing all staff and students guidance in the recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior
allows for earlier intervention by the threat assessment team. Finding a solution to this problem
is a primary goal of this applied research study.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this applied study was to solve the problem of inadequately trained
support staff in the recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to
the community, self, or others at John Doe High School located in southeast Virginia by
developing and implementing online training modules. A multimethod design will be used
consisting of qualitative and quantitative approaches. The first approach was interviews with the
division level school safety coordinator and the school-based threat assessment team, which
includes individuals with expertise in administration, instruction, law enforcement, and
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counseling. The second approach was focus groups with support staff, which includes
custodians, bus drivers, paraprofessionals, front office staff, and school security officers. The
third approach was participants completing an online training module on behavioral threat
assessment. This was followed by a survey that will measure their perception regarding the
effectiveness of the training at improving their threat assessment knowledge.
Significance of the Study
Research conducted of 37 acts of targeted violence in K-12 schools as a result of the
School Safety Initiative found that other students knew the plans of the attacker prior to most
attacks, however, did not report it to an adult. All students, faculty, and staff have the capacity to
recognize aberrant or threatening behavior and report it to the threat assessment team prior to an
act of violence to self or others. There is a need for all individuals within the school community
to receive guidance on aberrant or threatening behavior and how to report it through the
appropriate channels. Threat assessment is outlined in Virginia Code 22.1-79.4 and establishes
that threat assessment teams “shall provide guidance to students, faculty, and staff regarding
recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to the community,
school, or self” (DCJS, 2020, p. 7). Based on this requirement, it is imperative that these
stakeholders receive training to build capacity for recognizing and reporting threatening
behaviors.
Teachers and staff at John Doe High School were asked through the 2018 Secondary
School Climate Survey “does your school use a formal threat assessment process to respond to
student threats of violence” and 30% indicated “yes,” 7% “no,” and 63% indicated that they “do
not know” (p.20). Code of Virginia requires all schools to have a formal threat assessment
process and John Doe High School does have a process, however, most teachers were unaware
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and there is no indication support staff are aware of the process or how to spot and report
aberrant or threatening behavior. These numbers are relatively consistent across the
Commonwealth with regards to the lack of knowledge about the use of threat assessment teams
and not unique to John Doe High School as evidenced by statewide school safety audit reporting
(Cornell et al., 2018). The Federal Commission on School Safety outlines the importance for
schools to “establish and provide training” and “programs and policies must be put into place
that promote a climate that ensures those reporting feel safe in their concern” (Federal
Commission, 2018, p. 54). While the scope of this problem is narrowly focused on one school, it
clearly is a problem across the state and any efforts to solve the problem could be applied to all
schools in Virginia’s 132 school divisions.
Research Questions
Central Question: How can the problem of inadequately trained support staff in the
recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to the community,
self, or others be solved at John Doe High School located in southeast Virginia?
Sub-question 1: How would members of the school-based threat assessment team in an
interview solve the problem of inadequately trained support staff in the recognition of
threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to the community, self, or others at
John Doe High School located in southeast Virginia.
Sub-question 2: How would support staff in a focus group solve the problem of
inadequately trained support staff in the recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may
represent a threat to the community, self, or others at John Doe High School located in southeast
Virginia.
Sub-question 3: How would an online training module and post-training survey data
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solve the problem of inadequately trained support staff in the recognition of threatening or
aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to the community, self, or others at John Doe High
School located in southeast Virginia.
Definitions
1. Aberrant behavior – is that which is atypical for the person or situation and causes
concern for the safety or well-being of those involved (DCJS, 2016, p.9).
2. Behavioral threat assessment – a fact-based process emphasizing an appraisal of
observed (or reasonably observable) behaviors to identify potentially dangerous or
violent situations, to assess them, and to manage/address them (DCJS, 2016, p. 9rative).
3. Pathway to Violence – process of targeted violence that includes ideation, planning,
preparation, and implementation (DCJS, 2016, p.15).
4. Targeted violence – the end result of a process of thinking that begins with an idea,
progresses to development of a plan, moves on to preparation to carry out the plan, and
culminates in an attack (DCJS, 2016, p. 15).
5. Threat – a concerning communication or behavior that indicates an individual poses a
danger to the safety of school staff or students through acts of violence or other behavior
that would cause harm to self or others (DCJS, 2016, p. 9).
Summary
Providing guidance to support staff through the development of a training module to
recognize threatening or aberrant behavior to self or others is the primary goal of this study.
Initially, this may seem to be a relatively simple solution that can be met through staff in-service
and some basic instruction. However, there must also be a process for reporting, responding to
the reports, and most importantly, creating a school climate that lends itself to a culture of trust
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in reporting. Through interviews of the threat assessment team members, the goal was to
identify ways to address school climate, create a process for providing guidance to support staff
on recognizing threatening and aberrant behavior, leverage online training modules, and
establishing processes for reporting. A facilitated focus group convened to learn what school
support staff perceive about threat assessment and what would constitute a threat or demonstrate
aberrant behavior. Additionally, support staff were solicited to learn the best approach for
providing an online module that meets their needs. Interviews and a focus group were used to
inform the development of a brief online training module specific to all support staff. The online
training module was provided to each participant and immediately followed by a survey. The
survey was used to measure whether the participants believed that the online training module
increased their knowledge in threat assessment.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Overview
To understand behavioral threat assessment and its potential relationship to the
recognition of threatening and/or aberrant behavior it is important to establish a conceptual
framework that may contribute to such behaviors (Bickman & Rog, 2009). The conceptual
framework is discussed to comprehend the evaluation of social control theory and the
development of social bonds. The choice to utilize a conceptual framework provided context to
understanding of the importance to providing guidance to a particular problem of practice
(Imenda, 2014). The foundation of threat assessment in law enforcement was explored and its
integration into school threat assessment teams was grounded in the work of the Safe School
Initiative. The literature surrounding the “lessons learned” as a result of significant school
shootings, and other acts of targeted violence, was identified in an effort to establish a baseline of
specific behaviors observed during those previous events. Virginia’s relevant legislative
mandates and requirements for school divisions were evaluated to create a framework of what is
legally required of threat assessment teams. Finally, data collected through the Virginia
Secondary School Climate Survey provided insight to the percentage of staff that are aware of
formal threat assessment teams in their schools.
Conceptual Framework
Social Control Theory
While many social control theories exist, the focus will be on social bond theory and how
it may integrate into the threat assessment process. The connection between violence that occurs
in school and weak social bonds is well established in the literature (Pittaro, 2007). Historically,
most criminological theories attempt to determine why people deviate from societal norms;
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however, social control theories attempt to explain why people choose to conform (Akers &
Sellers, 2013). While school curriculum typically focuses on academia there has been an
increased need to address interpersonal relationships, motivation, and social support among
students and school personnel to adjust to an academic environment in order to improve school
adjustment (Lakhani, Jain, & Chandel, 2017). Improved school adjustment is not the only factor
to consider as it relates to social bonding. Students’ strong social bonds tend to improve
academic progress, reduce dropout rates, and lead to increased levels of school attachment,
involvement, commitment, and belief (Peguero, Ovink, & Li, 2016). Additionally, strong social
bonds play an important role in the healthy development of children contribute to “academic
performance and social competence” (Catalano, Haggerty, Oesterle, Fleming, & Hawkins, 2004,
p. 252).
Schools, to some degree, allow for socialization to the social norm, in spite of subculture
norms or family values (Walker, Shea, & Bauer, 2004). This often begins in kindergarten with
simple rules, structure, and socially acceptable behavior. For instance, students are taught to
walk on the right side of the hallway, raise their hand before speaking, take turns with others,
share with peers, and follow the rules. In fact, to a large extent the earlier grades establish a
foundation for appropriate and expected behavior which is ideally built upon throughout the
school career. In some situations, the social expectations run counter to behavior that is learned
at home, which is often the source of many discipline issues. Certainly, some students fail to
conform and are often “at odds” with the behavioral expectations of the school, or even
individual classroom teachers (Walker et al., 2004). For most students, however, they follow the
rules and demonstrate appropriate behavior that is congruent with adolescent maturity (Fisher,
Gardella, & Tanner-Smith, 2019).
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Social bond theory. Social bond theory, in which Travis Hirschi is considered the
primary theorist, is the most recognized social control theory (Bouffard & Rice, 2010). Hirschi
developed this theory as a response to the observed turbulence of the 1960s in the United States.
He was attempting to answer why individuals were engaged in behaviors outside of the
acceptable social norms (Hirschi, 2002). He theorized that weak social bonds contributed to
deviant behavior (Bouffard & Rice, 2010). There are four components identified as crucial to
creating a social bond. They are attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief (Pittaro,
2007).
The theory relating to social bonds has been repeatedly studied using various attributes
and behaviors. It is important to note that previous studies on weak social bonds focus on risky
or deviant behavior occurring, not on delayed onset (Han, Kim, & Ma, 2015). One such study
conducted by Han, Kim, and Ma (2015) attempted to explore whether strong social bonds
decreased the onset of alcohol use among youth. The Korea Youth Panel Survey, which is
administered nationally to youth was used to conduct discrete-time logistic regression. The
researchers found a negative relationship between youths’ attachment to their teachers and
delayed alcohol and cigarette use. Additionally, commitment and involvement were found to
reduce how early they begin smoking cigarettes and consuming alcohol. Their findings certainly
demonstrate the need for preventative strategies such as establishing and building relationships,
creating positive school climate, and involvement in school community.
Attachment. This is often considered the most crucial component of a strong social bond
(Pittaro, 2007). Attachment is defined as “an individual’s sensitivity and empathy for the
feelings of others” (Pittaro, 2007, p. 6). Attachment is a critical component to not only being
connected to the school community, but also having a relationship that increases the opportunity
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for others to recognize aberrant behavior. Individuals that develop a grievance that leads to
ideation about committing an act of targeted violence frequently lack attachment to the school
community (Watts, Province, & Toohy, 2019). Ideation is the first step identified in the pathway
to violence and this is motivated by a grievance, or perceived grievance (DCJS, 2020). Of 37
school shootings evaluated by the United States Secret Service they found that 71% of the
shooters felt “persecuted, bullied, threatened, attacked or injured by others prior to the incident”
(Vossekuil et al., 2004, p. 21). Mass murderers, whether in schools, or some other venue, share
“similar dynamics of mistreatment, alienation, hopelessness, and desire for public revenge in a
final suicidal act” (Cornell, 2014, p. 29). These feelings by a potential attacker do have the
capacity to move beyond a grievance and develop into the ideation of a vengeance mindset
(Capellan, 2015).
One study on attachment explored the characteristics of 18 individuals that engaged in
targeted school violence between 1996 and 2012 (Lenhardt, Graham, & Farrell, 2018). The
characteristic of alienation was identified in 67% of the shooters. Based on this study, the
researchers concluded that perpetrators of targeted mass attacks are often described as a “lone
wolf” and have very few meaningful relationships with others (Capellan, 2015). It is often
observable when a student has minimal attachment to the school community. It may manifest as
limited social interaction with peers, poor relationships with teachers, and isolation during
activities. Despite the assumption that all students involved in acts of targeted violence lack
attachment, research of school shootings between 1974 and 2000 indicates that 41% of school
shooters appeared to “socialize with mainstream students or were considered mainstream
students” and only 34% were considered to be “loners” (Vossekuil et al., 2004, p. 20).
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Commitment. The commitment involved in social bonds is related to the pursuit towards
school, a career, or some other goal that is to be attained through effort on their part. When an
individual is committed to work or school it provides opportunity to develop attachment to others
and share norms within the group (Pittaro, 2007). In many cases, school shooters do not have
any long-term career aspirations since they typically expect to either be killed, arrested, or
choose to commit suicide (Pittaro, 2007). Furthermore, most shooters are not only homicidal,
but suicidal and consider their final act to be suicide as a result of law enforcement intervention
(Vossekuil et al., 2004).
Involvement. The premise of involvement is that if an individual is involved in school
through academics, social relationships, and activities, they will have minimal time to engage in
criminal behavior (Pittaro, 2007). Vossekuil et al. (2004) found that 56% of school shooters
have not been involved in extracurricular activities within or outside of school. However, they
do spend a considerable amount of time planning and preparing when they have made the
decision to carry out an act of targeted violence (Vossekuil et al., 2004). Many school shooters
have spent a considerable amount of time researching previous school shootings and the
shooters, rather than becoming involved in school activities such as sports, clubs, and academics
(FBI, 2017). The school shooting in Columbine, Colorado is often the most studied event for
school shooters and the Columbine shooters are often viewed as mentors to prospective shooters
(National Threat Assessment Center, 2019).
It is reasonable that when there is strong involvement in the school community there will
also be greater attachment and commitment. The shooters that carried out the mass attack on
Columbine High School were not involved in the school community, lacked attachment to their
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peers and teachers, and there was no evidence of commitment to aspirations such as a life
beyond high school (Ogle, Eckman, & Leslie, 2003).
Belief. The application of believing in the rules and accepting of societal norms is
considered to be a preventative factor for people engaging in criminal behavior, or
nonconforming behaviors (Pittaro, 2007). All school divisions establish policies that outline
acceptable student behavior that are based on societal norms; however, they are not always
consistent and congruent with every subculture. For instance, all school divisions in Virginia
have policies regarding student dress code, however, some students and/or families may not
subscribe to the same belief of what is acceptable (Virginia Department of Education, 2015). The
subculture may be a community with a shared belief system, a neighborhood, family, or a small
group of individuals. Consequently, students and their family may recognize that a rule exists,
however, they may not accept the rule since they do not subscribe to that particular social norm.
Typically, people follow the rules regardless of whether they subscribe (Zink, 2008).
In many cases, school shooters have a grievance, or a perceived grievance, directed
towards an individual or group of individuals, which may lead to a sense of rationalizing their
behavior and thereby reducing empathy towards others (Meloy et al., 2015). The research does
not clearly identify any one trait that contributes to an individual developing homicidal ideations
that leads to targeted violence. However, there are several factors that have been identified in
many school shooter profiles that may contribute to a sense of alienation and a lack of
attachment. These factors include body-related concerns (obesity, acne, stature), psychosis,
exposure to trauma, and social problems (Langman, 2017). Many individuals experience some
of these traits, however, most do not commit violent acts and usually develop appropriate social
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bonding. There is no profile of a school shooter, however, there are several characteristics that
tend to be prevalent and can be observed by school personnel (Vossekuil et al., 2004).
Application of social bonds to the recognition of aberrant behavior. Weak social
bonds do not necessarily lead to an individual engaging in targeted violence, or any other
criminal behavior. However, there is evidence to suggest that there are observable signs that an
individual may be on the pathway to violence (FBI, 2017). Those signs may manifest through
weak social bonds that could be observed by members of the school community. This may
include individuals that are demonstrating signs of despair, suicidal thoughts, depression,
significant losses, obsession with previous attacks, isolating, and making previous threats
(Doherty, 2016; FBI, 2017; Modzeleski & Randazzo, 2018). It is important that someone in the
school community recognizes an individual that may be demonstrating any of these signs in
order to refer to the threat assessment team for further investigation. Even if these behaviors do
not indicate that an individual is on the pathway to violence it certainly establishes a need for
possible services and creates a record in the event there is a pattern of concerning or aberrant
behavior (DCJS, 2020).
Self-Control. Despite the influence of attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief
the individual is clearly expected to maintain self-control. Hirschi (2002) maintains that those
with weaker bonds have less expectations and as a result will demonstrate less self-control
(Bouffard & Rice, 2010). Complicating the matter is that self-control is often limited due to the
late maturation of the frontal cortex, which does not fully develop until around 25 years of age
(American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry [AACAP], 2016). As a result, impulse
control, risky behavior, and aggression are negatively impacted (AACAP, 2016).
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School-based victimization. Students that have been victims of criminal acts such as
robbery, larceny, or assault and battery have traditionally been defined as school-based victims
(Popp & Peguero, 2012). Recently, the definition of school-based victimization has been
expanded to include harassment, fear, and bullying (Muschert & Peguero, 2010). Most student
that are victimized or bullied by their peers do not engage in criminal behavior; however,
research suggests that “school-based victimization is associated with criminal offending” in
students that engage in threatening behaviors ((National Threat Assessment Center, 2019; Popp
& Peguero, 2012, p. 3372). It is theorized that the victimization leads to a weaker bond in
individuals, which can increase the likelihood of deviant behavior (Hirschi, 2002; Popp &
Peguero, 2012). Historically, many school shooters felt hopeless and vulnerable as a result of
being victimized through “bullying and exclusion” (Henry, 2009, p. 1252). In most cases of
targeted acts of violence in schools the shooter had been a victim of bullying and felt persecuted
by their peers (National Threat Assessment Center, 2019). Students that are bullied are less
likely to feel connected to the school community and may have weaker social bonds than
students who are not bullied; consequently, this could attribute to increased deviant behavior in
some people (Cecen-Celik & Keith, 2019).
Related Literature
Threat assessment practices are guided by years of research and practice in the field. An
overview of the establishment of threat assessment in educational settings is provided. Several
comprehensive studies on acts of targeted violence have been conducted to better identify preattack behaviors and warning signs. This research serves as the basis for the threat assessment
model used in Virginia schools and is detailed in this chapter. Additionally, an overview of
Virginia specific legislation detailing the requirements for threat assessment teams, the process
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for assessing and managing threat cases, and the consideration of school climate are detailed.
Finally, a review of literature specific to professional development with the consideration of inperson versus virtual delivery is provided.
Foundation of Threat Assessment
Threat assessment practices do not have their origin in schools, but rather law
enforcement (Modzeleski & Randazzo, 2018). It is important to establish how law enforcement
applies threat assessment to assess if an individual is on a pathway to violence and if a credible
threat exists. The shooting at Columbine High School was the impetus for collaboration between
law enforcement and education personnel to establish behavioral threat assessment teams
(Vossekuil et al., 2004). The methods used by law enforcement to assess a situation by
collecting available information and assessing the credibility of the threat is the cornerstone of
behavioral threat assessment.
United States Secret Service and the Safe School Initiative. The United States Secret
Service (USSS), while best known for protecting political dignitaries, also responds to
communicated threats of violence. These threats can be communicated through any means, to
include verbal, written, electronic, or implied. Threat assessment has long been used by the
USSS to determine if an individual, or group of individuals, pose a risk of violence and if
appropriate, intervene prior to an incident occurring (Vossekuil et al., 2002). Following the
highly publicized shooting at Columbine High School in 1999 the USSS and the USDOE
collaborated on a project known as the Safe School Initiative. The purpose of the collaboration
was to develop guidance that schools could use to apply threat assessment management from a
law enforcement setting to a school setting. The Safe School Initiative reported that “researchers
identified 37 incidents of targeted school violence involving 41 attackers that occurred in the
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United States from 1974, the year in which the earliest incident identified took place, through
June 2000” (Vossekuil et al., 2002, p. 8). The data collected by the research team provided
evidence that there are reasonable steps that a school can take to possibly prevent and act of
targeted violence through the implementation of assessing a threat. Vossekuil et al. (2002) found
there were 10 key findings that have become the basis for school-based threat assessment
models. The findings are:
1.

Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely were sudden, impulsive acts.

2. Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker’s idea and/or plan to
attack.
3. Most attackers did not threaten their attackers directly prior to advancing the attack.
4. There is no accurate or useful “profile” of students who engaged in targeted school
violence.
5. Most attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the incident that caused others
concern or indicated a need for help.
6. Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal failures.
Moreover, many considered or attempted suicide.
7. Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted or injured by others prior to the attack.
8. Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.
9. In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity.
10. Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most shooting incidents were stopped by
means other than law enforcement intervention (p. 31).
Pathway to violence. Researchers found that there is a pathway to violence that shooters
take prior to an incident, which consists of grievance, ideation, planning, preparation, and
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implementation (Modzeleski & Randazzo, 2018). The first stage of the pathway begins with a
grievance. This occurs when an individual has a grievance as a result of some perceived wrong
directed towards them and they identify as having been bullied or victimized. Most people have
likely experienced a grievance at some point; it rarely escalates and is often addressed through
some nonviolent measure (DCJS, 2020). There may certainly be cause for the grievance based
on some degree of victimization perpetrated towards the individual, however, this may progress
to the second stage on the pathway, known as ideation. During ideation, they may fantasize
about seeking revenge against an individual, or society, as a result of this grievance.
The third stage is identified as planning where the individual begins to develop how they
would carry the act out (DCJS, 2020). This may include a very formal planning process that is
written down as an outline, the recording of observations that could lead to success, or
researching previous shooting incidents. For example, a female adult student in Frederick
County, Maryland was arrested in 2017 after it was discovered she had been planning a mass
shooting and bombing at her school (Masters, 2018). There was extensive planning involved,
which she recorded in a very detailed journal. She had observed the schedule of the School
Resource Officer (SRO) and planned to kill them first to increase her success. She manipulated
several male students into unknowingly acquiring individual components to create explosives in
order to not raise suspicion by buying the materials at the same time. She built fully operational
explosive devices and concealed them in her basement, which were discovered at that time of her
arrest. Her plan even included purchasing a shotgun with a small gauge since she recognized a
large gauge shotgun would make it difficult to execute the act. Writing down her detailed plans
in a journal ultimately led to her arrest and conviction before she could carry out her attack
because her father discovered her journal and reported it to law enforcement. (Masters, 2018).
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The fourth stage is preparation, which involves the individual acquiring what is needed to
carry out the act (DCJS, 2020). This may include the acquisition of materials to successfully
complete the act such as acquisition of weapons, explosives, body armor, or diversionary
devices. It may also include the individual participating in a “dry run” of the event to practice
and increase success. For example, the individual responsible for the mass attack at Virginia
Tech practiced shooting targets at an outdoor range with his weapon, to include laying the targets
on the ground to imitate that his victims were in a prone position. This was a behavior he
actually followed through with during the mass shooting. Additionally, he acquired chains and
locks to prevent students from leaving the building to increase his number of fatalities (TriData
Division, System Planning Corporation, 2009). The preparation stage may also involve the
subject preparing to die once the act is executed, which may include giving away possessions,
preparing a suicide note, or recording a video.
The final stage is implementation-the individual fulfilling the targeted violence (DCJS,
2020; FBI 2017). This is the culmination of the grievance/ideation, planning, and preparation of
the fulfillment of the act of targeted violence. At this point, the threat assessment process is not
an effective strategy, and the response shifts to preventing the attack through a lockdown
response and the deployment of law enforcement to stop the attack.
When conducting threat assessments, it is useful for the threat assessment team to
identify where a subject is on the pathway to violence continuum. The goal is to avert a potential
threat, remove them from the pathway, and provide support to reduce further harm (Vossekuil et
al., 2004). Initially, the threat assessment team is tasked with triaging the incident that is
reported to determine if the threat is imminent (DCJS, 2020).
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Pre-attack behaviors. In 2018 the Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) with the FBI
conducted a study to identify behaviors that were exhibited by individuals prior to an active
shooting incident. This study examined active shooter situations in the United States between
2000 and 2013 and attempted to identify characteristics of active shooters to apply the findings
to establish preventative steps. This study was not exclusive to school shooting incidents;
however, the findings did indicate that there were no significant differences in the pre-attack
behaviors of school and non-school shooters (Silver, Simons, & Craun, 2018).
These pre-attack behaviors are often observable by family, friends, members of the
community, school employees, and classmates. Members of the school community may
recognize behaviors that cause concern; however, they may be unaware of the process for
reporting. In some cases, the concerning pre-attack behaviors in an individual with intent to
cause harm may be a sudden change in mood, attempt to acquire weapons or some other resource
needed to carry out an attack, or a sudden interest in previous mass violence events (National
Threat Assessment Center, 2019). The National Threat Assessment Center (2019) conducted a
study of 41 acts of targeted school violence at school between 2008 and 2017 and found that in
every case the “attackers exhibited concerning behaviors” and “most communicated their intent
to attack” (p.52).
Some of these pre-attack, or warning behaviors, may not indicate that an individual is apt
to engage in violent behavior; however, it is reasonable for the threat assessment team to
evaluate whether the individual is on the pathway to violence. At the very least, many of the preattack behaviors may indicate a need for intervention and/or support, even if the individual is not
on the pathway to violence. School shooters often communicate a threat to a third party in a
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manner that may leave the recipient unsure of the seriousness of the communicated threat
(Meloy, Hoffmann, Guldimann, & James, 2011).
A major finding by Silver et al (2018) relating to threat assessment is that on average,
active shooters displayed four to five “concerning behaviors over time that were observable to
others around the shooter” (p. 7). This is particularly important for schools to consider when
measuring school climate, training on the recognition of aberrant behavior, and developing a
process for reporting concerning behaviors. Schools have multiple members within their
community that have the capacity to observe behaviors that may cause concern. These members
include instructional staff, support staff, administrators, parents, and students. Each of these
individuals represents a connection to an individual that may be on the pathway to violence, or in
need of support.
Leakage. Threat assessment would have very little positive impact if the prospective
attacker did not reveal something that was observable. Theses pre-attack behaviors are known as
leakage and “occurs when a student intentionally or unintentionally reveals clues to feelings,
thoughts, fantasies, attitudes, or intentions that may signal an impending violent act. These clues
could take the form of subtle threats, boasts, innuendos, predictions, or ultimatums” (O’Toole,
1999, p. 16). In almost all mass shootings there has been significant leakage that is observable
and often reported as a concern after the incident occurs (Lankford, Adkins, & Madfis, 2019).
There are certainly many cases where leakage was reported to the appropriate authorities and as
a result the attack was averted. However, there are some mass shootings where there was no
discernable leakage observed. For example, the Las Vegas mass shooter did not reveal any
discernable warning signs or grievance, however, he clearly demonstrated potential mental
health concerns. Events like the Las Vegas shooting may seem like these events are not
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preventable, however, that is the exception. Considering the significant levels of leakage present
many of these attacks can be prevented early into the pathway of violence, even in school
settings (DCJS, 2020). The potential to prevent targeted attacks through recognition of aberrant
or threatening behavior by members of the school community necessitates the need for training.
Behavioral Threat Assessment in Virginia
The mass shooting at Virginia Tech in 2007 led to significant legislative changes by the
Virginia General Assembly (DCJS, 2020). Virginia legislation required institutions of higher
education to create threat assessment teams for the purpose of managing aberrant behavior
(DCJS, 2020). Following the incident at Sandy Hook Elementary School the Commonwealth of
Virginia became the first state to legislatively require every K-12 public school to have threat
assessment teams (Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, n.d.). Initially, the
legislation required threat assessment teams to only consider threats by students, however, in
2016 the legislation was amended to change the language from students to individuals (DCJS,
2020).
It was recognized by the Virginia General Assembly that threats to cause harm to the
school community are not unique to students and may include parents, former students, staff, and
individuals with no affiliation to the school (DCJS, 2020). Virginia was the only the state with
mandated K-12 threat assessment teams in every public school until after the incident at
Parkland, Florida in 2018 (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2019). Since that time the
State of Maryland and Florida have passed legislation based on Virginia’s law and several other
states have consulted with the Virginia DCJS to explore developing similar legislation (DCJS,
2020).
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Virginia threat assessment model and implementation. When Virginia legislatively
required threat assessment teams, they did not require schools to utilize a particular threat
assessment model, however, the language did require schools to use a model consistent with the
DCJS Model Policies (DCJS, 2020). Dr. Dewey Cornell at the University of Virginia (UVA)
developed a model, known as the Virginia Student Threat Assessment Guidelines (VSTAG),
prior to the legislative mandate that has been in use by some school divisions in Virginia and
other states. Based on previous surveys conducted by the DCJS most school divisions utilize the
DCJS model; however, there are some school divisions that utilize the VSTAG model (DCJS,
2017). There are slight differences in the VSTAG model and the DCJS model, however, they
both follow a similar process based on the threat assessment model used by the Secret Service.
The VSTAG model does not consider threats to self as a function of the threat assessment, where
the DCJS model does.
Regardless of the model used the threat assessment process begins with someone from
the school community observing a concerning or aberrant behavior that is initially reported
through some process and the threat assessment team triages the threat to determine the validity,
urgency, the implementation of protective measures, and the assembly of the threat assessment
team. The team then assesses the threat and determines the threat enhancers and mitigators.
Finally, the threat is managed through the development of strategies, monitoring, and
reassessment as necessary (Reeves & Brock, 2017). The use of threat assessment provides a
flexible approach to resolving a problem without the application of a zero-tolerance approach,
resulting in better outcomes for the student (Cornell et al., 2018). Threat assessment does have
the capacity to be a “problem-solving approach to violence prevention that focuses on resolving
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the conflict or difficulty that stimulated the threat and working out a solution that allows the
student to continue in school” (Cornell, Allen, & Fan, 2012, p. 102).
Role of threat assessment teams. Threat assessment teams in all Virginia K-12 public
schools are required to assess and intervene for any behaviors that may pose a threat to the safety
of the school or to self (DCJS, 2020). A threat assessment team is a multidisciplinary team that
is composed of individuals with expertise in instruction, counseling, administration, and law
enforcement (DCJS, 2020). Many threat assessment teams elect to also add team members with
expertise in special education, school psychology, and social work. In addition, social workers
may be aware of programs in the community that could help provide additional options for an
opportunity response (Bent-Goodley, 2018).
Based on Virginia Code threat assessment teams are required to “provide guidance to
students, faculty, and staff regarding recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may
represent a threat to the community, school, or self” (DCJS, 2020, p. 7). It is critical that all
members of the school community are not only aware of the threat assessment process, but they
should be aware of how to recognize aberrant or threatening behavior. Not only does this
increase the capacity for recognition and reporting, but possibly provides needed services before
an individual carries out a threat. School staff and students may notice a change in behavior or
observe threatening or aberrant behavior; however, they do not report it to the threat assessment
team for further investigation (Nekvasil & Cornell, 2012). It is important to consider the role of
staff that support non-educational purposes in the school environment, such as bus drivers,
school security officers, and custodial staff. Support staff typically do not receive training
beyond what is necessary to perform their job, however, their involvement with the school
community provides opportunity to be a critical part of the threat assessment process.
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Threats are categorized based on the seriousness of the threat and organized into four
categories: low risk, moderate risk, high risk, and imminent. All public K-12 schools in Virginia
are legislatively required to report quantitative data on threat assessments to the DCJS annually.
This data is used to inform practice, conduct training, and establish policy. During the 2016-2017
school year there were 9,238 threat assessments conducted in Virginia schools and 928 (10%) of
threats were classified as high/imminent (DCJS, 2018, p. 14). Of those 928 threat cases only 40
(less than 1%) were carried out (DCJS, 2018, p. 14).
In Virginia, roughly half of all documented threats in K-12 schools are for threats to self
(DCJS, 2018). Suicide is the second leading cause of death of individuals in the United States
between the ages of 10-24 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2015). While
school shootings receive a significant amount of media coverage and legislative action, there are
still far more students that harm themselves, than commit homicide. Assessing for risk of
suicide can only happen if there is a process in place for identifying a student of concern and
responding appropriately (Crepeau-Hobson, 2013). The threat assessment team is tasked with
not only assessing threats to self or others, but also providing resources and services to mitigate a
threat and remove an individual from the pathway of violence (Vossekuil et al., 2004).
Although threat assessment teams are required to provide an incredibly specialized risk
assessment most of these team members do not have training specific to criminal behavior
(DCJS, 2016). Of course, this is one reason law enforcement is a required member of the team.
The team must consider and evaluate multiple reports, evidence, statements, and in some cases
arbitrary information to arrive at an appropriate threat disposition. This can lead to difficulty
identifying a threat and assigning the appropriate classification (Goodrum, Evans, Thompson, &
Woodward, 2019). Virginia Code also allows law enforcement to share adult and juvenile
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criminal history with the threat assessment team for the purposes of accurately determining an
appropriate threat level (DCJS, 2020). Law enforcement may also have relevant information
based on calls for service to the home of the subject of interest.
Community threat assessment. Despite the requirement that all Virginia K-12 public
schools and institutions of higher learning have threat assessment teams, there is no legislation
that extends the reach of threat assessment teams or their functionality beyond the school and/or
campus setting. Considering that some school shooters, and others that have perpetuated
targeted violence at a school, were not current students it stands to reason that considering
community threat assessment is vital to mitigating potential threats (National Threat Assessment
Center, 2019). Regardless of whether the shooter is a current student or not, there is benefit to
the establishment of communication between schools and outside law enforcement regarding
aberrant or threatening behavior.
The individual responsible for the school shooting in Parkland, Florida was known to
local and federal law enforcement for hateful speech and calls for service to his residence.
Additionally, when he was a student at Marjorie Stoneman High School there were significant
concerning behaviors that resulted in disciplinary action (Camp et al., 2018). However, there was
nothing in place to connect the concerning behaviors between the school, local law enforcement,
federal law enforcement, and the community. Essentially, community threat assessment widens
the net of assessment and provides more information across a greater scope of influence, which
could increase the capacity to mitigate a threat regardless of the origin or potential target.
There are certainly privacy concerns and overreach by many advocates about the
implication of threat assessment and its extension beyond schools. Constitutional protections
afforded by the Fourth and First Amendments are still relevant, however, in many cases the
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individual’s behavior and communications are conducted within public domain which include
social media platforms and online public forums (Camp et al., 2018). Any speech communicated
within a public domain is not afforded the protections under the Fourth Amendment and are
subject to investigation by law enforcement (Congressional Research Service, 2019). With the
increased use of social media platforms and electronic devices laws and statutes are continually
amended to reflect threatening and harassing language through electronic means. While law
enforcement attempts to monitor public message boards and social media platforms for
threatening behavior, there still remains the need for citizens to report concerning behaviors.
Many mass shooters, of schools and other venues, made initial statements on social media or
other communication platforms and were only discovered after the event occurred (National
Threat Assessment Center, 2019).
Threat assessment training. While Virginia requires all K-12 public schools to have
threat assessment teams there is no legislative requirement that teams receive formal training.
The DCJS does provide free training on a regular basis throughout the state, however, it is often
difficult for all members of a threat assessment team to attend. The 2017 Virginia School Safety
Audit Survey Results indicate that 7,439 teachers serve on threat assessment teams, however,
only 36% received training. Research conducted where pretests were compared to posttests after
receiving threat assessment training indicates “substantial changes in their knowledge and
attitudes regarding school violence (Allen, Cornell, Lorek, & Sheras, 2008, p. 329). Threat
assessment training conducted by the DCJS for school divisions includes information on the
legislative requirements of threat assessment and the responsibilities of the team, historical basis
for threat assessment, recognition of threatening and aberrant behavior, framework of the School
Safety Initiative, and case management, and participation in assessing a mock case. The training
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is intended for the threat assessment team members and the expectation is that the threat
assessment team will then provide guidance to staff, faculty, and students on the recognition of
threatening or aberrant behavior towards self or others.
The current training provided by DCJS lasts seven hours and is designed to prepare
members of the school threat assessment team in conducting and managing threat assessment.
There is a considerable emphasis on providing participants with the legal requirements of
information sharing with respect to the Family Educational Rights Protection Act (FERPA) and
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). All participants are provided
with a mock scenario with the goal to conduct a threat assessment with a mock team during the
training. Ideally, the team will be the actual threat assessment team from the same school,
however, it is not always practical to have all members of the threat assessment team at the
training. Every effort is made to structure the mock teams to include expertise in administration,
instruction, counseling, and law enforcement. These mock teams are required to ask questions of
the facilitator to apply an investigatory mindset to the process. Based on the questions they ask
and who they choose to interview they will learn more information that will assist in determining
the appropriate threat level. This is an opportunity to calibrate a threat assessment team to
ensure an appropriate threat level is determined based on the facts of the case. The final threat
level will dictate the appropriate response and lead to how the case is managed to prevent and/or
mitigate the threat.
The DCJS is responsible for conducting a Secondary School Climate Survey of every
public high school and middle school. High schools conduct the survey during even numbered
years and JDHS last participated in the Climate Survey in 2018. Schools have the option to
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administer the student climate survey to all students, or randomly select 25 per grade level. Staff
are encouraged to participate, however, there is no legislative requirement to participate.
In this survey, the staff was asked, “does your school use a formal threat assessment
process to respond to student threats of violence” (JDHS, 2019). The results at JDHS indicated
that only 30% of teachers were aware that threat assessment existed at their school, 7% indicated
there was not a threat assessment process, and 63% indicated that they did not know (JDHS,
2019). The state average for high schools during the same year was 53% of teachers were aware
of a formal threat assessment process (JDHS, 2019). Considering the widespread knowledge of
threat assessment by teachers it is probable that support staff threat assessment knowledge is
lower than teachers.
Conducting a threat assessment. Upon receiving a report of threatening or aberrant
behavior the team must first determine if the threat is imminent. If so, then it would require
immediate law enforcement intervention, and depending on the nature of the threat it may
require implementation of a lockdown process. Otherwise, the team attempts to answer
questions as outlined in the Threat Assessment in Virginia Public Schools: Model Policies,
Procedures, and Guideline (2020) in order to guide the team towards an outcome. The key
questions are:
1.

What are the subject’s motives, grievances, goals and intent in their behavior?

2. Have there been any communications suggesting ideas, intent, planning or
preparation for violence?
3. Has the subject shown inappropriate interest in/identification with:
a. Incidents of perpetrators of targeted/mass violence
b. Grievances of perpetrators
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c. Weapons/tactics of perpetrators
d. Notoriety or fame of perpetrators?
4. Does the subject have (or are they developing) the capacity and will to carry out an
act of targeted of violence?
5. Is the subject experiencing or expressing hopelessness, desperation, and/or despair?
6. Does the subject have a positive, trusting, sustained relationship with at least one
responsible person?
7. Does the subject see violence as an acceptable, desirable – or the only – way to solve
a problem?
8. Are the subject’s conversation and “story” consistent with his or her actions?
9. Are other people concerned about the subject’s potential for violence?
10. What circumstances might affect the likelihood of escalation of violence (p. 36-37)?
These questions are based on the findings from the School Safety Initiative and are used
as a guiding framework for teams to determine if an individual is on the pathway to violence, as
opposed to demonstrating attention seeking or typical adolescent behavior (Storey, Gibas,
Reeves, & Hart, 2011). Most threat assessment cases are triaged and found to be low risk by the
threat assessment team, however, there are cases that require a great degree of management
(DCJS, 2018). While identification of a threat is important, it is only once facet of the process.
Managing the threat is critical to not only removing the individual from the pathway of violence,
but also following up with services. These services can include professional mental health
evaluations, responding through special education services as applicable, pursuit of criminal
charges, change in placement, and meeting the needs of potential victims ((DCJS, 2020)
While criminal charges or school-based consequences are a possibility, that is not the
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primary goal of threat assessment (DCJS, 2018). Safety to the entire school community and
preventing an act of violence or threat to self-harm is paramount to the threat assessment process.
Threat assessment often has a victim that needs to be considered in addition to the subject of
concern. Additionally, the subject of concern may also have victim issues to be considered that
require services to address. In fact, it may have, in part, led to the concerning or aberrant
behavior that had led to the need for a threat assessment.
Most threats are made by current students; however, the threat assessment can include
any individual (DCJS, 2018). School divisions often represent the largest employer in a locality
and workplace violence still occurs at a much higher rate than violence at school. Threat
assessment should also be used to evaluate threats made by employees, spouses of employees,
parents of students, former students, and individuals from outside of the school community. The
shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary was committed by an individual who had never been
affiliated with the school. The school shooting in Parkland, Florida was committed by a former
student. Clearly, there are additional challenges to threat assessment if the subject of concern is
not a student, however, this punctuates the need for communication between law enforcement
and the school division.
Legislative Requirements. Virginia has been proactive in passing legislation to address
school safety concerns. As stated previously, in 2008 Virginia first enacted threat assessment
legislation as outlined in Virginia Code §22.1-79.4. This was in response to the mass shooting at
Virginia Tech in 2007. Initially, this only applied to institutions of higher education. Following
the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School, Virginia established the Governor’s Children’s
Cabinet, which was tasked with evaluating K-12 school safety practices. There were numerous
recommendations, but of interest for the scope of this research the Cabinet recommended the
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requirement of threat assessment teams in K-12 public schools (DCJS, 2020).
Following the shooting at Parkland, Florida in 2018 Governor Ralph Northam directed
the General Assembly to create a House Select Committee on School Safety. As a result, the
Committee findings led to the passing of House Bill 1734 to direct the DCJS to develop a case
management tool for the purposes of managing threat cases and the collection of quantitative
data. The goal of the case management tool is to provide greater continuity through the duration
of a student’s career between schools and ultimately through college (Virginia Department of
Criminal Justice Services, n.d.). The case management tool will be a program that works in
conjunction with a school division’s student information management system. The user will
input the facts and findings for each threat assessment and develop a plan for intervention and
long-term management.
School climate and threat assessment. School climate is often considered a measure
that benefits the well-being of students. However, recently this is being expanded to the overall
safety of the school for teachers and students (Gregory, Cornell, & Fan, 2012). Researchers
suggest that a positive school climate has numerous benefits for students (Gregory et al., 2010).
These benefits include lower suspension rates (Gregory, Cornell, & Fan, 2011), lower rates of
aggression and violence (Gregory et al., 2012), and lower substance abuse rates (Cornell &
Huang, 2016).
Every public middle and high school in Virginia are required to survey students and staff
every two years using the Virginia Secondary School Climate Survey. The data is used to
produce an individual report for every school that not only provides metrics on the perception on
a host of questions, but also establish the type of school climate as perceived by students. All
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schools are encouraged to use these reports to inform their school improvement plan and take
necessary measures to improve school climate (Cornell et al., 2018).
School climate borrows its framework from the work around Baumrind’s (1968) theory
of authoritative parents. The premise of school climate theory focuses on two axes that are
described as either low or high. The first axis is the structure at school. Structure refers to the
established rules at the school and how they are consistently and fairly applied to all students.
The second axis is the level of support and caring attitude provided to students by staff
(Heilbrun, Cornell, & Konold, 2018). School climate can be described based on whether a
school is high or low on each axes, which leads to four identified types of school climate. When
students perceive their school as low support and low structure the school climate is considered
neglectful. Low structure and high support is considered a permissive climate. High structure
and low support is an authoritarian climate. High support and high structure is identified as an
authoritative school climate and considered to be a positive school climate (Huang, Eklund, &
Cornell, 2017).
The relationship between school climate and threat assessment is dependent upon the
culture of the school community and whether a threat is likely to be reported. Students may be
hesitant to report a concern to a trusted adult if the school climate is not identified as supportive
(Lankford et al., 2019). Consequently, a positive school climate certainly improves
communication and positive relationships among students and faculty (Cornell et al., 2018).
Threat assessment becomes effective when the school has a climate where staff and students feel
safe to report a concerning behavior or communication of a threat. If a school climate is
considered to be authoritarian, then due to the high structure and low support it is reasonable to
assume that some students may believe that reporting a threat to school authorities would cause
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harm or consequence. However, an authoritative school climate with high structure and high
support may lead a student to understand that reporting the behavior will be handled by the threat
assessment team in a manner that is consistent with the climate and culture of the school (Cornell
& Huang, 2016).
Role of media. The media cannot be blamed for the horrific actions of an individual
with respect to initiating targeted violence; however, they should be responsible for their
reporting and any unintended consequences that may occur. There is concern that shootings are
often sensationalized through significant coverage of the event (E.R., 2015). Often, the shooter
receives excessive coverage that could lead some individuals to sympathize with the shooter’s
victimization through bullying or exposure to trauma (Elliot, 2015). Through significant
coverage of the event and shooter by the media it often creates notoriety that inspires future
events. The name of the shooter, their troubled past, and their story is almost always told in
detail, yet the victims are rarely mentioned beyond the memorial (Elliot, 2015).
Of particular interest is the notion of media contagion, which has led to “copycat”
behaviors. The shooting at Columbine in particular has led to at least 13 copycat attempts
specifically based on inspiration of that event (Pescara-Kovach & Raleigh, 2017). This can lead
to shooters being viewed as martyrs by some and only perpetuate the shooter over the victims.
The media contagion is further complicated by the increased scope of social media to
report on all incidents across the country and further increase awareness of the horrors associated
with such an event. This includes using social media during, or immediately following an active
shooter event. Mazer et al (2015) conducted a review of social media use as a result of two
separate school shooting incidents and found that there is a significant increase in the use of
social media to report on mass shootings, however, it is frequently full of inaccuracies. The
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researchers evaluated the volume of posts, frequency of posts, social media content,
misinformation, and calls for action and found that both shootings had numerous posts on
Facebook and Twitter and reposting for several days following the event (Mazer et al., 2015).
Save.org describes “helpful reporting,” as opposed to “harmful reporting,” which is described
“as assisting others in learning to identify behaviors of concern and, upon doing so, increasing
their knowledge of how to respond to those who pose a possible threat” (Pescara-Kovach &
Raleigh, 2017, p. 42).
Implementation of Professional Development through Online Learning
Support staff need to be trained on recognizing threatening or aberrant behavior,
however, there are often restrictions to provide in-person professional development such as
available hours outside of their contracted responsibilities. However, training presented through
an online format could serve to address some of the challenges associated with in-person
training. The level of professional development needed on threat assessment is very limited
compared to the training required for threat assessment team members. As such, it is reasonable
to develop a training module for support staff to deliver threat assessment training that is 15 to
30 minutes, which tends to be the preferred length of time to maintain engagement (Morgenroth,
2017).
Challenges of online training. The traditional learning environment of all participants
in the same room, learning at the same time in front of an instructor is one modality for
professional development. With improvements in platforms for learning management systems
and almost universal access to computers and the Internet there are increased opportunities to
receive professional development online at a time and place that is convenient for the learner.
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For school divisions, there are relatively few days scheduled for traditional in-person
professional development during the school year.
While all professions require continued learning to improve and respond to the needs of
the organization, the field of education sees constant changes to policy and practice. Teachers,
administrators, and counselors hold professional licensure that requires evidence of continuing
education for licensure renewal. With the exception of school security officers, support staff do
not require a state license or certification specific to their job that is required by the Virginia
Department of Education. School security officers are required to complete 16 hours of
approved coursework related to their role every two years, however, there is no requirement
specific to threat assessment (Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, n.d.).
For instructional staff, professional development is often centered on topics such as
instruction and content specific strategies. There is very little opportunity to provide training on
topics such as threat assessment. One of the greatest challenges to providing training to support
staff is their employment classification. Support staff are typically identified as “classified
employees” by definition and limited to their contracted hours per week. By contrast, teachers,
counselors, and administrators are “non-classified” and are salaried employees. This
classification allows administration to provide teachers and counselors training beyond the
regularly scheduled contract hours.
Additionally, support staff may not always report directly to the building administrator,
which may impact who provides training. Bus drivers usually report to a division transportation
director, school security officers may report to a division school safety director, and custodians
may actually be contracted through a private company. All of these positions certainly support
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the overall mission of the school, however, their training typically focuses on the specifics of
their job and they have very limited hours contracted for additional training.
It is reasonable to assume that online learning will not be the preferred modality for all
learners, particularly adults that currently have limited experience using these platforms. It is
likely some learners have had negative experiences with previous online training. This may have
been due to a training module that did not consider how to best engage adult learners (Pic, 2015).
However, there are differences in online education for college credit and online training for
professional development. At the very least, the learner participating for college credit enrolled
in the course and has a vested interest due to requirements related to achieving a passing grade.
Learners that complete online professional development as a required part of their job are often
told to complete the training and not given freedom to choose. In some cases, “learning that is
imposed on adults will be met with resentment and is minimally effective” (Gog et al., 2010, p.
228). There may not be adequate “buy-in” and the training may be viewed as a “check in the
box” to remain employed. The requirement to attend, or complete a training, for work is no
different regardless of whether it is in-person or online, but some of the time constraints can be
mitigated if an option to complete required trainings can be completed at the learners’
convenience (Scott, Feldman, & Underwood, 2016). Knowles (1984) surmised that adult learners
are motivated to learn, but it is based on whether they find it necessary. Establishing buy-in is
important so that learners will see the value to their job and the empowerment to impact change.
Benefits of online training. The use of online training provides an opportunity for the
learner to complete content specific modules anywhere there is an internet connection and the
availability of a device capable of participating in the training. With improvements to online
learning there has been an increase in its use by employers, institutions of higher education, and
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K-12 education. In some cases, it is used to supplement education through an asynchronous elearning model, or could occur through a platform that is synchronous (Rovai, 2002).
Costs. In-person behavioral threat assessment training in Virginia costs between $2500
and $5000 per day and is capped at 50 participants (Brad Stang, personal communication, April
15, 2020). While this training is designed for individuals serving on threat assessment teams and
not necessary for support staff, an instructor with subject matter expertise would still be quite
expensive for an abbreviated in-person session. The conversion of the material into a short
training module would be substantially cheaper than a full day with an instructor, however, the
real benefit is the ability to reach all staff with the training module with no increase in cost.
Time and flexibility. Availability of time to participate in anything beyond the scheduled
workday is often limited and competes with personal obligations. Traditional in-person training
would not be cost effective to conduct in increments of 15 minutes considering the daily cost of
threat assessment training (Brad Stang, personal communication, April 15, 2020). However,
online training has the capacity to be delivered in short submodules. These submodules could
deliver a particular concept or topic in a few minutes, allowing the learner to build upon an
overarching concept. This provides the learner the opportunity to complete training through
short lessons asynchronously during a time that best fits their schedule.
Customized training. An online threat assessment training module has the capacity to be
developed and delivered based on the role of the learner. Generally, most support staff will have
similar training needs with respect to behavioral threat assessment. However, with the
introduction of submodules it may be appropriate to customize a training package based on the
learner. Front office staff are likely to have a greater deal of interaction with parents and visitors
to the school, while bus drivers will primarily interact with students. Custodial staff may
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observe threats through written communication as a result of graffiti. School security officers
are likely to have more involvement with the SRO and school administration as a result of their
role. Beyond the scope of this current study there certainly are implications for expansion to
students, parents, law enforcement outside of the role of SRO, and the community.
Online training assessments. A reasonable concern with online training is course
fidelity and the effectiveness of improving participant knowledge. The participant could
certainly advance through a training module without viewing or listening to the material,
however, to improve attention to the lesson there should be formative assessments to check for
understanding throughout the module (Gog, Sluijsmans, Brinke, & Prins, 2010). Not only will
these formative assessments compel the participant to actively engage the material, but also serve
to reinforce important concepts. Additionally, if the training module is accessed through a
learning management system then there are several features to improve actual completion of the
course, to include disabling the ability for the participant to advance through a slide prematurely.
Online training effectiveness. If online training is ineffective then any cost or time
savings cannot be justified. There is a growing body of research to suggest that online training is
at least as effective as in-person training based on pretest and posttest data, and in some cases,
there tends to be higher posttest scores with online training (Scott et al., 2016). The increase in
knowledge attained through online learning may be a result of students taking “ownership of the
material rather than being passive receptacles of a teacher in a commonly used face-to-face
didactic teaching environment” (Scott et al., 2016, p. 267). However, not all participants will
experience similar gains for a variety of reasons. Neither will have the same level of familiarity
and comfort level to learn through autonomous learning (Rabe-Hemp, Woollen, & Humiston,
2009).
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Summary
The implementation of the threat assessment process and the corresponding teams to
manage reports of aberrant and/or threatening behavior is critical to mitigating potential
violence. There is a significant body of evidence to suggest that threat assessment can
effectively remove an individual from the pathway of violence and prevent or mitigate an act of
violence (FBI, 2017; Jonson, 2017; Lankford et al., 2019; Meloy et al., 2011; Modzeleski &
Randazzo, 2018; Silver et al., 2018; DCJS, 2020). It is not, however, the only step in the
process. In fact, without timely recognition and reporting of aberrant behavior to a threat
assessment team the formal process is not provided the opportunity to assess and intervene.
There are countless stories of concerning behavior that others have observed, however, failed to
report until after the tragedy occurred (National Threat Assessment Center, 2019). The purpose
of this applied study is to solve the problem of inadequately trained support staff in the
recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to the community,
self, or others at John Doe High School located in southeast Virginia by developing and
implementing online training modules. A multimethod design will be used consisting of
qualitative and quantitative approaches.
Threats of harm to self or others can be mitigated or prevented by reporting observable
concerns to the appropriate authorities (Meloy et al., 2011; National Threat Assessment Center,
2019). Support staff represent a fairly well embedded segment of the school community, yet
they do not have formal training in behavioral threat assessment and most do not have an
awareness that threat assessment teams exist in their schools (Cornell & Huang, 2016). The
development of online training modules may have the capacity to improve the knowledge of
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threat assessment. This includes the ability to recognize aberrant or threatening behavior and
report concerning behaviors through the appropriate process at the school.
The goal was to provide support staff with the knowledge to recognize behavior or
communication that represents a threat and know the appropriate process in place at JDHS. The
current literature, established best practice, threat assessment guidelines, and Virginia Code
drove the development of a succinct online training module that improved the participant
perception of threat assessment knowledge as evidenced by the post-training survey. This
project has the capacity to live beyond the dissertation and participants at JDHS. Ideally, this
will serve as the foundation and pilot for a series of online training modules on threat assessment
for all stakeholders within the Commonwealth of Virginia.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS
Overview
The purpose of this applied study was to solve the problem of inadequately trained
support staff in the recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to
the community, self, or others at John Doe High School located in southeast Virginia by
developing and implementing online training modules. A multimethod design was used
consisting of qualitative and quantitative approaches. To collect qualitative data, the researcher
conducted interviews with the members of the threat assessment team at JDHS and conducted a
focus group with support staff at JDHS. Additionally, an online training module was developed
that provided an overview of the behavioral threat assessment process, the recognition of
threatening and aberrant behavior, and the reporting procedures specific to JDHS. After
participants viewed the online training module, a five-point Likert scale survey was immediately
administered to determine their perception regarding the effectiveness of the online training
module at improving their knowledge.
There were two participant groups in this study. The first was the school-based threat
assessment team participants, which was comprised of those with expertise in administration,
law enforcement, counseling, and instruction. Additionally, a school safety coordinator for the
division was included in the interview group. The second group of participants were support
staff, which included a combination of those serving in the following roles: paraprofessionals,
school security officers, a substitute teacher, and a speech therapist. The setting was John Doe
High School in southeast Virginia and the ultimate goal was to provide systemic changes to how
support staff are trained to recognize and report aberrant and/or threating behavior.
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Design
A multimethod research design was used for this applied study. The choice to choose a
multimethod research design was based on the capacity to develop a “comprehensive research
plan” and “implement and monitor the plan” (Bickman & Rog, 2009, p. 3). The objective of this
research design was to identify and correct a problem of practice as it relates to the lack of threat
assessment training for support staff. The use of a descriptive research design was the most
appropriate considering it captures the “phenomenon as it naturally occurs” (Bickman & Rog,
2009, p. 15).
Data were obtained through interviewing the threat assessment team which including two
school administrators, a teacher, the school resource officer as well as the division safety and
security coordinator. Additionally, a focus group was conducted with support staff
representation and facilitated by the researcher to identify ideas and solutions for the problem of
the inadequate training of support staff when recognizing threatening or aberrant behavior that
may represent a threat to the community, self, or others at John Doe High School. To gather
quantitative data, the researcher developed a brief online training module for support staff on
behavioral threat assessment with a post-training survey. The survey measured the perceived
effectiveness of the online training module at increasing knowledge on the purpose and role of
threat assessment, recognizing threatening or aberrant behavior, and the process for reporting a
threat at JDHS.
Research Questions
Central Question: How can the problem of providing adequate training to support staff
to increase their capacity to recognize threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a
threat to the community, self, or others be solved at John Doe High School located in southeast
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Virginia?
Sub-question 1: How would members of the school-based threat assessment team in an
interview solve the problem of inadequately trained support staff in the recognition of
threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to the community, self, or others at
John Doe High School located in southeast Virginia?
Sub-question 2: How would support staff in a focus group solve the problem of
inadequately trained support staff in the recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may
represent a threat to the community, self, or others at John Doe High School located in southeast
Virginia?
Sub-question 3: How would an online training module and post-training survey data
solve the problem of inadequately trained support staff in the recognition of threatening or
aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to the community, self, or others at John Doe High
School located in southeast Virginia?
Setting
The pseudonym of John Doe High School (JDHS) was selected to maintain confidentiality
of the school. The setting for this study was chosen based on several factors. First, the location
is within close proximity to the researcher, and this provided convenience in conducting the
focus group. This school had been identified by both the researcher and staff in the building as
not providing training on the recognition or threatening or aberrant behavior to support staff. All
middle and high schools in Virginia are required to participate in the Secondary School Climate
Survey (Cornell et al., 2018). Additionally, the researcher is very familiar with the locality
where the school is located and has an interest in improving the outcomes of the school and
ultimately the division.
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JDHS is situated in one of seven school divisions that make up a region of southeastern
Virginia, which is one of eight superintendent regions in Virginia. For the 2018-2019 school
year JDHS reported 2,146 enrolled students. The school had 42.3% White, 41.4% Black, 6.4%
two or more races, 5.7% Hispanic, 3.6% Asian, 0.4% Native Hawaiian, and 0.2% American
Indian. Students with disabilities represented 18.3% of the student population and 30% are
described as economically disadvantaged (JDHS, 2018). The school is a traditional ninth
through 12th grade school and was accredited during the 2018-2019 school year. The principal is
supported by four assistant principals that are assigned per grade level. Additionally, there is an
athletic director and six guidance counselors. The school does have one school resource officer
(SRO) assigned by the local police department. There are approximately 60 support staff
assigned to JDHS in the following positions: front office staff (4), paraprofessionals (12), school
security officers (6), bus drivers (30), and custodial staff (8). The division has a newly created
position to oversee school safety, which includes threat assessment training and management.
Participants
The sample pool was confined to JDHS and participants were selected using convenience
sampling. The decision to utilize convenience sampling as a nonprobability sample design is
based on the notion that the participants are “readily available” and “some of the needed study
data have already been collected” through the Secondary School Climate Survey (Bickman &
Rog, 2009, p. 81). Utilizing this type of purposeful sampling allowed the researcher to make
selections in participants and site locations based on the ability to “purposefully inform an
understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon” (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p.
158). The researcher required assistance in selecting the participants for the focus groups and
interviews. The school administrator was selected based on convenience sampling, however,
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snowball sampling was used to identify support staff that would be appropriate to participate in
the focus group (Rovai, Baker, & Ponton, 2013). This allowed the researcher to leverage the
knowledge of the school administrator, who was familiar with the staff at the school (Gall, Gall,
& Borg, 2007).
Interview Participants
The first school administrator (AP 1) had been employed in public education for 14 years
and has been assigned to JDHS for three years. AP 1 has served on the threat assessment team
for three years and had been provided formal threat assessment training by DCJS. The SRO
(SRO 1) has worked in law enforcement for 9 years, been an SRO for three years, and has served
on the threat assessment team the entire time during their assignment at JDHS. SRO 1 has
received formal threat assessment training by DCJS while attending the SRO Basic Course. The
school counselor assigned to the threat assessment team was asked to participate in the interview,
however, they were unavailable. A second school administrator that serves on the team was
interviewed (AP 2). AP 2 has been employed in public education for 20 years and assigned to
JDHS for 10 years. The teacher (Teacher 1) was assigned to the threat assessment team during
the 2021-2022 school year and had not received threat assessment at the time of the interview.
Teacher 1 has been employed in public education for 21 years and assigned to JDHS for three
years. The central office coordinator (Coordinator 1) has worked in law enforcement for four
years, served as a fire fighter for 20 years, a teacher for three years, an administrator for four
years, and at the time of the interview oversaw all school safety and security operations for the
division during the past two years.
The Researcher’s Role
There were reasons why this researcher was interested in assessing the problem of
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providing awareness and training around threat assessment. The researcher’s primary occupation
is the K-12 School Safety and Threat Assessment Manager with the Virginia Center for School
and Campus Safety at DCJS, where he is responsible for supervising several legislative
mandates, training SROs, school security officers (SSOs), and school personnel on school safety
related requirements and best practices, providing technical assistance on several school safety
related topics, and overseeing all aspects of the legislative requirements for K-12 threat
assessment. A significant amount of technical assistance this researcher provides is devoted to
developing and training about behavioral threat assessment and responding to targeted violence.
Threat assessment extends beyond the K-12 school environment and includes institutions of
higher education, private schools, churches, and businesses. Most often, this relates to targeted
acts of violence and the psychological factors associated with their behavior. It is both a
professional and personal motivation to mitigate acts of violence that cause harm to self or others
since these tragedies have a significant impact on communities, to include the school
community.
It was important to recognize the potential for allowing preconceived ideas to guide the
research as it relates to behavioral threat assessment. To mitigate assumptions, emergent coding
was used to organize data collected during the interviews and focus groups. Furthermore,
bracketing was used by creating a mind map through the NVivo software. There are multiple
methods that can be utilized to conduct bracketing as it relates to qualitative research, however, it
may be most useful to consider more than one method (Tufford & Newman, 2010). There are
benefits to bracketing as it “enables a deeper level of researcher engagement and integration
throughout all aspects of the qualitative research endeavor” (Tufford & Newman, 2010, p. 93).
It was useful to integrate memoing as a part of interviewing and the facilitation of the focus
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group. This was done to establish ideas and connect them to the data being collected (Creswell &
Poth, 2018).
Procedures
The school division where the study was conducted required submission of the research
parameters, Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval documentation, and an overview of the
study and how it may benefit the division and/or school through the completion and submission
of a form. Formal permission to conduct research was granted by the school division and a letter
was provided to the researcher indicating approval (see Appendix H and I). A succinct overview
of the purpose of the study was provided to the JDHS principal, in addition to assurances of
confidentiality.
Permission from the IRB was obtained on April 14, 2021(see Appendix A for IRB
approval). Once permission had been obtained per IRB guidelines to conduct research the
researcher contacted the school administrator during the spring of 2021, however, due to the
impact of COVID-19 and an anticipated change in leadership at JDHS it was delayed. The
opportunity to meet with the new principal did not occur until September 2021. The scope of the
project was discussed, and a plan was established to collaborate with AP 1 to elicit participants
through a combination of convenience sampling and snowball sampling. However, the very next
day there was a school shooting in a nearby school division, which led to several social media
threats to attack JDHS. This required significant resources by JDHS, law enforcement, and the
threat assessment team. Understandably, the research was delayed for several weeks.
Once JDHS was able to allow the research to continue, the names and positions of the
threat assessment team members were obtained from AP 1. Additionally, the names and contact
info were requested of all support staff at JDHS and organized based on role. The participants
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were initially contacted through their division email with a short introduction, an overview of the
participation requirements, and the recruitment letter. AP 1 provided notice to support staff and
threat assessment team members that they would receive an email from the researcher.
Interviews were conducted with members of the threat assessment team and Coordinator 1.
There were five interview participants.
The focus group had representation from employees that were identified as support staff.
The focus group was composed of paraprofessionals, school security officers, a speech therapist,
and a substitute teacher. An attempt to obtain custodians, bus drivers, and office staff was
unable to be arranged, however, one school security officer had worked as a bus driver for 21
years and was able to provide feedback related to that role.
Quantitative data collection
Survey Monkey was the software used to develop a survey that was administered
immediately following the participants completion of the online training module. The posttraining survey was organized into three sections to solicit subsets of data. The first section
gathered descriptive statistics, the second section measured the perception of increased
knowledge in threat assessment, and the third section measured the perception of the
effectiveness of the online training module. The first section required participants to select their
role, provide a numerical answer to years in the division and at JDHS, and provide “yes” or “no”
responses to prior training and awareness. The second and third section required the participants
to select either “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “neither agree or disagree,” “agree,” or “strongly
agree.” The target for support staff participating in the online training module and post-training
survey was 25; however, 21 participants completing the training and survey.

71
Data Collection and Analysis
To collect data that captured the current state of threat assessment awareness by the
school community and their capacity to recognize aberrant behavior the researcher used multiple
methods. Multiple interviews and a focus group were utilized to collect qualitative data and
establish what the participants know and believe. Furthermore, the questions attempted to
identify what may increase an understanding and awareness of threat assessment and the
recognition of aberrant behavior by support staff.
Interviews
The first sub-question for this study explored how threat assessment team members in an
interview would solve the problem of inadequately trained support staff in the recognition of
threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to the community, self, or others at
John Doe High School located in southeast Virginia. Four interviews were conducted using the
Zoom platform in a private room free from distractions. One interview was conducted in the
office of the participant at their request. The researcher conducted semi-structured interviews to
establish rapport and gain an understanding of the school climate, cultural considerations, and
unique challenges by structuring the interview questions around topics instead of specific
questions (Bickman & Rog, 2009). The questions were used to establish baseline information
about the participants’ role as a member of the threat assessment team, previous training, and the
number of threat assessments they conduct annually. Additionally, information about their years
of experience in education, in the division, and at JDHS was obtained.
The interviews were recorded using Otter AI software installed on the researcher’s laptop
and phone. Notes were recorded during the interview to capture any relevant information
beyond the scope of the recording, such as observed non-verbal communication. The entire
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recording was transcribed and reviewed by the researcher to check for accuracy and add
appropriate notes. Interview transcripts were imported into the qualitative data analysis software
NVivo to organize the findings and any ideas, or themes, that can be classified into codes
(Creswell & Poth, 2018). A database was constructed that organized the codes into four themes
to allow for “assessing inter-rater reliability among multiple coders” (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p.
190). The goal was to discover emerging patterns and create a visual display of the data. The
interviews were conducted with a total of five faculty members which included a school
administrator, counselor, school resource officer, teacher, and the division safety and security
coordinator.
Interview questions. There was a total of five participants interviewed independently. This
included four members of the JDHS threat assessment team. To gain an understanding of the
division perspective on threat assessment and professional development an interview of the
division safety and security coordinator was conducted. Questions one through thirteen
primarily applied to the administrators and teacher. Questions 14 through 19 applied to the SRO
and questions 20 through 24 applied to the safety and security coordinator. All 24 questions
were presented to the participants; however, they were advised that some questions may not be
applicable to their role. The interview questions are:
1. What is your current position and title?
2. How many years have you worked in this school division?
a. How many years have you worked at this school?
3. How many years have you worked in the field of education?
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4. A threat assessment team is required by Virginia Code to be composed of expertise in
administration, counseling, instruction, and law enforcement. Who typically fulfills that
requirement on your threat assessment team at this school?
5. On average, how often does your threat assessment team meet per school year for the
purpose of assessing a threat to self or others?
6. Describe all of the formal and informal threat assessment training you have received?
7. Describe any additional training that complements your role as a threat assessment team
member.
8. When gathering information for assessing a threat, please describe who you consulted
about what they may have observed or heard? Please use the best role or title to describe
them.
9. How many hours on average per year do the following support staff receive professional
development?
a. School security officers
b. Bus drivers
c. Front office staff
d. Paraprofessionals
e. Custodians
10. How is professional development delivered to support staff?
11. What type of training do teachers outside of the threat assessment team receive on the role
of a threat assessment team, recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior, or how to
report a threat?
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a. How about support staff? This includes bus drivers, front office staff, school
security officers, custodial staff, and paraprofessionals.
b. Can you briefly describe the training? (length of training, frequency,
structured, etc…)
12. How does the school track online training that is completed by school personnel?
13. How do staff report a concern about an individual that is demonstrating possible
threatening or aberrant behavior?
a. Who do they report that information to?
14. How many years have you been assigned to the role of SRO in this school division?
a. How many years have you been assigned to this school?
15. How many years have you worked in law enforcement?
16. Prior to your assignment as an SRO, what was your previous role?
17. Please describe the training you received in preparation for your role as an SRO.
a. Who provided the training and in what year?
18. Please describe any formal behavioral threat assessment training you have received.
a. Who provided the training and in what year?
19. Please describe how you receive reports from the school community regarding threatening
or aberrant behavior that is ultimately addressed through the threat assessment team?
a. Please describe the roles, titles, or positions of the individuals that have reported a
threat to you that is either directed towards someone in the school community or
themselves.
20. Describe current practices for providing professional development for support staff within
the division.
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21. How many professional development hours, on average, do support staff receive per
school year?
22. What training topics do support staff receive? Describe using the following:
a. By role: school security officer, front office staff, paraprofessional, custodian, bus
driver
b. Upon hiring
c. Periodically
23. What training modality is used to provide training (i.e., online platform, in-person, other)?
24. How many hours are allocated in support staff contracts specific for professional
development?
Questions one through three and 14 through 17 not only established a baseline for years
of experience and threat assessment training for the members of the threat assessment team, but
also provided an opportunity to build rapport between the participants and the researcher
(Bickman & Rog, 2009). Questions four through eight, 13, 18, and 19 provided a basis for each
participant’s knowledge on threat assessment as established by Code of Virginia and the Model
Policies, Procedures, and Guidelines created by the Virginia DCJS. The Model Polices establish
the framework that threat assessment teams follow to assess and manage threats (DCJS, 2020).
Questions nine through 12 and 20 through 24 assessed how the school division addresses the
professional development needs of teachers and support staff, to include tracking online training.
Specifically, question 23 was asked to explore whether the division currently uses online training
to deliver professional development. Findings from Rovai (2002) indicate that employers have
increased the use of online learning as an exclusive platform, or to supplement existing in-person
training.
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Focus Group
The second sub-question for this study explored how support staff in a focus group
would solve the problem of inadequately trained support staff in the recognition of threatening or
aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to the community, self, or others at John Doe High
School located in southeast Virginia. The use of a focus group was to identify how the school
can increase an understanding and awareness of the threat assessment process and the
recognition of threatening and/or aberrant behavior. There was an opportunity by the
participants to engage in an open response to this problem of practice. The discussion was
facilitated by the researcher through an interview guide (Bickman & Rog, 2009). The focus
group met at JDHS in a location free of distractions and was arranged by AP 1 during a
scheduled early release day. The focus group discussions were recorded using Otter AI software
installed on the researcher’s laptop and phone. Notes were recorded during the interview to
capture any relevant information beyond the scope of the recording, such as observed non-verbal
communication. The entire recording was transcribed and reviewed by the researcher to check
for accuracy, attribute the speaker to their role, and add appropriate notes. Focus group
transcripts were imported into the qualitative data analysis software NVivo to organize the
findings and any ideas, or themes, that can be classified into codes (Creswell & Poth, 2018).
The focus group was composed of 10 support staff participants; however, it will not
include school administrators. The selection for participants was based on snowball sampling at
the recommendation of AP 1. The participants included school security officers,
paraprofessionals, a speech therapist, and a substitute teacher. The researcher moderated the
discussion and provided both direct and indirect questions to elicit what support staff believed
they needed with respect to training and how they see their role as contributing to the culture of
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recognizing and reporting threatening and aberrant behavior. An interview guide was
implemented to provide structure to the discussion and keep the participants focused on the
purpose of the research questions. The researcher facilitated the discussion around threat
assessment, recognition of aberrant or threatening behavior, and ways to increase the school’s
capacity within the context of formal threat assessment procedures. Focus groups can also
complement the quantitative data collected through surveys and provide a richer understanding
than what is gained through a survey alone (Bickman & Rog, 2009).
The focus group was guided by the following questions:
1. Describe what may be considered a threat to your school community.
2. What do you believe to be the biggest challenge to identifying if someone is a threat?
3. Considering some of the examples you gave, how might you proceed in reporting what
you saw or heard?
4. In your opinion, in what ways could your school improve your knowledge of identifying
threatening behavior?
5. When considering training, what is the best format for you to learn? Do you prefer online
modules, in-person workshops, tabletop exercises, or something else?
6. In what ways does staff in your school understand the goals of threat assessment and how
to reports any concerns?
7. Describe the threat assessments conducted during this school year or any other during
your time at this school. This includes frequency, type of threats, possible outcomes.
8. Describe the type of threat assessment training you have received in the recognition of
behavior that may cause concern or seem to be threatening to someone else or to
themselves. When did you receive the training and who provided it?
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9. How do you think training and/or guidance in how to recognize and report threats would
be useful to preventing violence towards others or self?
10. If you were aware of a threat to self or others who would you tell, or how would you
report it?
Question one through four and six through 10 attempted to learn what members of the
focus group understand about threat assessment as defined by the Virginia DCJS Model Polices
(DCJS, 2020). Furthermore, these questions allowed an opportunity to learn about their current
knowledge about how to report a threat, who to report the threat to, previous assessments, what
constitutes threatening or aberrant behavior, and any previous threat assessment training.
Question five was asked to gain insight on the learning preferences of support staff. Scott et al.,
(2016) found that the effectiveness of online training is comparable to in-person training based
on pretest and posttest data.
Quantitative Data Collection
The third sub-question for this study explored how an online training module and posttraining survey data solve the problem of inadequately trained support staff in the recognition of
threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to the community, self, or others at
John Doe High School located in southeast Virginia. An online threat assessment training
module was developed that provided participants with an overview of behavioral threat
assessment and how to recognize threatening or aberrant behavior at JDHS. The online training
module was immediately followed by a survey to measure the participants’ perception of the
training effectiveness. The survey was constructed by the researcher using Survey Monkey. The
survey contained 14 statements that measured the perception of the online training module’s
effectiveness in increasing behavioral threat assessment knowledge.
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The support staff participants that consented to participate in training completed a selfguided online training module that was approximately 15 minutes in length. This module
provided an overview of the relevant content associated with behavioral threat assessment. The
online training module was developed by creating a storyboard based on the DCJS Model
Policies. The storyboard was then converted into a training module using Articulate software.
Since support staff do not typically serve as threat assessment team members they do not require
knowledge about conducting assessments. This module provided an overview of the content
congruent with the skills and knowledge necessary for their role in the school community. The
researcher created a format that provides instruction that is succinct and engaging with respect to
adult learning theories.
Ethical Considerations
All electronic data was password protected on the laptop used for this research study. All
paperwork associated with the research study was stored in a locked filing cabinet that only the
researcher has access. The division, school name, and participants’ actual names were not used
and any paperwork included that had identifiable information was redacted. There were some
documents the researcher used, such as the Secondary School Climate Survey, which has the
school and division name listed, however, all identifiable information was redacted. The school
was identified using the pseudonym of John Doe High School and all participant names were
identified through the use of a coding system that uses the title and applies a number.
Summary
The purpose of this applied study was to solve the problem of inadequately trained
support staff in the recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to
the community, self, or others at John Doe High School located in southeast Virginia by
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developing and implementing online training modules. The goal was to determine what support
staff currently know about threat assessment and how best to improve their capacity to recognize
threatening and/or aberrant behavior and report it using the appropriate process at JDHS. The
development of an online training module that is self-guided was be assessed for effectiveness as
evidenced by survey results.
The interview questions and focus group dialogue attempted to identify the scope of the
problem of inadequately trained support staff at John Doe High School on the current awareness
of behavioral threat assessment. In conjunction with previous research, best practices, and
mandated legislation the researcher identified a process for improving the goals of reducing
and/or mitigating targeted acts of violence, or threats to self. This applied dissertation had the
lofty goal of being more than an academic requirement, but was also the impetus for further
research and potentially increasing the effectiveness of behavioral threat assessment practices in
Virginia schools.

81
CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS
Overview
The purpose of this applied study was to solve the problem of inadequately trained
support staff in the recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to
the community, self, or others at John Doe High School located in southeast Virginia by
developing and implementing online training modules. The problem was John Doe High School
(JDHS) is not adequately providing guidance and training to support staff in the recognition of
threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to the community, self, or others. A
multimethod design was used consisting of qualitative and quantitative approaches. Chapter
Four will provide a synthesis of the qualitative and quantitative data collected, identify themes,
and provide “corroborating evidence through triangulation of multiple data sources” (Creswell &
Poth, 2018, p. 260). This was accomplished by presenting the findings from the threat
assessment team interviews, support staff focus group, and survey group as it relates to the three
sub-questions and identified codes and themes.
The following questions guided this research:
Central Question: How can the problem of providing adequate training to support staff
to increase their capacity to recognize threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a
threat to the community, self, or others be solved at John Doe High School located in southeast
Virginia be improved?
Sub-question 1: How would members of the school-based threat assessment team in an
interview solve the problem of inadequately trained support staff in the recognition of
threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to the community, self, or others at
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John Doe High School located in southeast Virginia?
Sub-question 2: How would support staff in a focus group solve the problem of
inadequately trained support staff in the recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may
represent a threat to the community, self, or others at John Doe High School located in southeast
Virginia?
Sub-question 3: How would an online training module and post-training survey data
solve the problem of inadequately trained support staff in the recognition of threatening or
aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to the community, self, or others at John Doe High
School located in southeast Virginia?
Participants
Threat Assessment Team Interview Participants
The interview participants were selected based on their membership as threat assessment
team members at JDHS. The one exception was the inclusion of a division level employee at
central office. The decision to include this individual was to gain insight into division level
professional development, threat assessment training, and division wide practices. The interview
was formatted as semi-structured using structured baseline questions; however, follow-up
questions were posed based on individual participant responses (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2007). Four
of the five interviews were conducted using the Zoom platform to accommodate the participants
due to time constraints. The remaining interview was conducted face-to-face in a private office.
The threat assessment team members were composed of three employees at JDHS and a school
resource officer (SRO) assigned to the school that serves on the school threat assessment team.
The SRO is assigned to JDHS through a cooperative memorandum of understanding (MOU)
between the school division and the local law enforcement agency, however, they are employed
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and supervised by the local law enforcement agency. To maintain confidentiality participants
were only identified by their assigned role (see Table 1).
Table 1
Threat Assessment Team Interview Participants
Role
Pseudonym
Years in Education
Assistant Principal
AP 1
14
Assistant Principal
AP 2
22
Teacher
Teacher 1
21
School Resource Officer
SRO 1
N/A
Central Office Coordinator
Coordinator 1
15
Note. The SRO has nine years in law enforcement and three years as an SRO at JDHS.
Focus Group Participants
The focus group was assembled based on their identified role as support staff at JDHS
using input from the school administrator. This method allowed the researcher to select
participants that were both representative of JDHS while still providing unique insight based on
their position (Bickman & Rog, 2009). The focus group was conducted at JDHS in-person
following an early release school day with the assistance of the school administrator. The
participants represented a variety of support staff roles and experience in the field of education.
A total of 10 individuals participated and were composed of one male and nine females. The
participants had previously been provided electronic copies of the IRB approved recruitment
letter and consent form. The consent form was provided at the onset of the focus group meeting
and participants did sign and return the consent form prior to recording (see Appendix B). To
maintain participant confidentiality participants were identified by their role and a numeral. (see
Table 2)
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Table 2
Focus Group Participants
Role
School Security Officer
School Security Officer
School Security Officer
School Security Officer
Paraprofessional
Paraprofessional
Paraprofessional
Paraprofessional
Speech Therapist
Substitute Teacher

Pseudonym
SSO 1
SSO 2
SSO 3
SSO 4
Para 1
Para 2
Para 3
Para 4
Speech 1
Sub 1

Survey Group Participants
Purposeful sampling was utilized to only recruit employees at JDHS that meet the
research criteria of support staff. The school administrator provided assistance by emailing the
recruitment letter and consent form to all eligible support staff employees. The email also had an
embedded link to the Online Training Module on Threat Assessment. Upon completion of the
module the user was directed to the survey to collect limited information on their role, prior
threat assessment knowledge, and a series of questions to measure their perceptions. There are
37 support staff at JDHS that are defined as either SSO, paraprofessional, office staff, or
custodial staff. Bus drivers are not directly assigned to JDHS, therefore, their access was
limited. During the survey window a total of 21 support staff completed the online training
module and completed the survey.
Results
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with four members of the threat assessment
team at JDHS and a division coordinator to identify themes related to current threat assessment
training, processes, and challenges. Several themes emerged based on the qualitative analysis
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conducted as a result of coding interviews using NVivo. Second, a focus group was conducted
with support staff from JDHS to identify themes based on their understanding of threat
assessment and training preferences. Finally, an online training video on threat assessment was
developed along with a follow-up quantitative survey to measure support staff perception of the
training’s capacity to improve their threat assessment knowledge.
Sub-question 1
Sub-question one for this study was, “How would members of the school-based threat
assessment team in an interview solve the problem of inadequately trained support staff in the
recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to the community,
self, or others at John Doe High School located in southeast Virginia?” Four of the interviews
were conducted through the Zoom platform and the one was conducted in-person. Each
interview was conducted free of distractions and in private. Interviews were recorded using
Otter AI software, which provided real-time transcribing of the interview. At the conclusion of
each interview the transcript was reviewed against the audio recording, speakers were identified
and notated, and corrections were made. Additionally, notes were added based on observations
such as tone, laughter, and non-verbal behavior during the interview. The final transcripts were
exported to NVivo for further analysis.
Priori coding was used to identify a minimal number of codes based on anecdotal
knowledge; however, emergent coding was the primary method used to organize the data. This
blended method minimizes the potential biases of the researcher in assigning a particular text or
passage to a predetermined code, instead of a code that better reflects the participant’s view
(Creswell & Poth, 2018). Individual interviews were coded and then refined into 18 distinct
codes, which were then catalogued into four themes. The themes of training challenges, Impact
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of COVID-19, Defining Threat Assessment, and Communication are displayed in Table 3 along
with their corresponding codes and frequency identified in the interview data.
Table 3
Threat Assessment Team Interviews Themes and Frequency of Codes
Theme
Training Challenges

Code
Training Delivery
Complementary Training
Time/Availability
Support Staff PD
Teacher TA Training
Support Staff TA Training
SRO Training

Frequency
7
3
2
15
6
1
1

Impact of COVID-19

COVID-19 Barriers
Mental Health

10
5

Threat Recognition
Threat Triage
Incorrect Definition of Threat
Self-Harm
Threat Cases

21
1
11
1
4

Trust
Social Media
Reporting Threats
Receiving Threats

5
5
10
13

Defining Threat Assessment

Communication

Theme 1: Training challenges. The theme of training challenges was identified based
on seven individual codes with a total frequency of 35 distinct references found across the
interviews. It was anticipated that barriers to training would exist for a variety of reasons,
however, the interview participants provided anecdotal evidence of substantial gaps in threat
assessment training for the team, the teachers, and the support staff. Findings from select codes
follow in an effort to identify the primary factors associate with the theme of training challenges.
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Time/availability. Providing professional development to educators is often plagued with
a variety of barriers due to availability during the school day, existing obligations after school,
and limited scheduled professional development days during the school year (McChesney &
Aldridge, 2019). Training for support staff is often limited due to the nature of their employment
contracts as hourly employees, as opposed to being salaried. In Virginia, teachers are required to
have time a planning period without students. However, support staff do not have allocated time
outside of their role.
Support staff PD. During the interview AP 1 and AP 2 indicated support staff training
was limited and in some cases was directed outside of JDHS. AP 2 stated, “I think once they get
hired they don’t have much PD and it’s very few and far between.” Coordinator 1 shared that
much of the training provided to support staff is “specific to their role and is directed at the
division level.” The support staff positions that were the focus of this research are employed in
very specialized roles within education and as a result their training is often limited due to the
need to meet those needs. Coordinator 1 indicated that SSOs are required by state law to
“receive a minimum of 16 hours every two years.”
Support staff threat assessment training. AP 1 stated support staff are included in a
“welcome back training in the summer,” however, they were not “formally trained” in threat
assessment. Teacher 1 was newly assigned to the threat assessment team and at the time of the
interview had not completed a threat assessment training. As a result, the responses to many of
the threat assessment questions demonstrated her threat assessment knowledge was consistent
with the support staff threat assessment knowledge as evidenced by the survey and the focus
group. The challenges associated with providing training to support staff as assessed by the
interview participants was consistent with the findings from the focus group. Additionally, the
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survey asked support staff whether they have “ever received behavioral threat assessment
training” and out of 21 respondents five indicated “yes,” 14 indicated “no,” and two indicated “I
do not know.”
Complimentary training. The interview panelists were asked about the types of
complementary training that could support the threat assessment process of identification of
aberrant behavior. All threat assessment team members indicated varying degrees of receiving
complimentary training, however, they indicated support staff did not. Coordinator 1 identified
the benefit of “looking at prior case studies, such as the one from Parkland, because you get to
see a lot of the things that were either missed or very evident after the fact.”
Training delivery. The interview participants were asked about training delivery at the
division and school level, which provided significant data to support alternative approaches to
conducting training. It was noted that due to COVID-19 and the increase in online instruction
and meetings that there was an increase in providing training through online platforms. AP 2
indicated the division subscribes to a “learning management system” that can be used to track the
“number of hours” of training completed. AP 1 stated that training is “delivered via . . . Vector”
which is the learning management system. There was no indication the degree to which support
staff participate in online training, however, many of the modules on Vector are accessible to all
staff.
Theme 2: Impact of COVID-19. It became apparent during the initial interviews that
the impact of COVID-19 was not only significant to school operations, but in all facets of the
school community. There were several statements revealed that presented various challenges as
a result of COVID-19. Some of these challenges were a result of guidance from the division and
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state on mask guidelines, which primarily manifested from parents. This led to increased threats
towards school board members and required the expenditure of resources to investigate.
COVID-19 barriers. It was consistently mentioned across four out of the five interviews
and clearly demonstrated the need to consider its implication on not only barriers to training, but
the need for increased training to address increased mental health needs. The statement of “prior
to COVID” was mentioned in three separate interviews to highlight the differences as a result of
the response to the pandemic. Identifying an individual that may be displaying aberrant or
concerning behavior becomes difficult when learning is occurring in a virtual environment.
When asked about conducting threat assessments Coordinator 1 stated, “there was very little
done, except for things that arose on Zoom.” The Zoom platform was used to provide instruction
during virtual learning and unless students communicated a threat electronically, or something
could be observed in the background of the students’ home it was difficult to observe behavior
that could cause concern. Despite the challenges to identifying aberrant behavior during the
virtual learning time period of the pandemic there were identified positives. For instance, the
requirement to utilize virtual platforms to meet and learn forced people to shift their concept of
training delivery. Even with far fewer in-person restrictions Coordinator 1 indicated the benefits
of online learning and stated, “I think the blended learning model allows people that cannot get
away from the building long enough to still participate without the travel time they needed.”
Mental health. Coordinator 1 indicated “with COVID our focuses shift to a lot of online
issues and mental health issues.” In spring of 2020 an Executive Order by the Governor of
Virginia required schools to shutdown due to COVID-19. In fall 2020, schools transitioned to
online learning for most of the school year before transitioning to a hybrid schedule.
Anecdotally, the interview participants report increased concerning behaviors and potential
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mental health issues. Coordinator 1 shared that “we’re starting to see that even the parents are
having some bizarre behaviors that is impacting the front office . . . and having to have these
conversations like I’m not sure what that person meant when they said this” and “now we’re
starting to see it maybe not so much with the students but with the parents, unreasonable
demands or unrealistic expectations.”
Theme 3: Defining Threat Assessment. It was anticipated prior to data collection there
would be inconsistencies in the recognition of aberrant or threatening behavior based on
anecdotal knowledge by the researcher. However, this theme emerged as significant based on
the frequency of associated codes across all interviews and the focus group. These
inconsistencies are due to a lack of training specific to threat assessment how people may define
the word threat. The focus group viewed a threat primarily as an active shooter situation
whereas opposed to subtle behavioral concerns that may require an assessment.
Threat recognition and incorrect definition of threat assessment. When interview
participants were asked to describe threat assessment it was frequently mentioned in the context
of an active shooter event or a crisis event. For example, Coordinator 1 stated, “we did the
active threat response training” and AP 2 stated, “was really heavy on the active shooter.”
Teacher 1 indicated she had not received threat assessment training at the time of the interview
and described threat assessment using the following words: “lockdown drills,” “bomb threat,”
“hard corners,” “active shooter,” at risk students,” “COVID safety standards,” “evacuation” and
“crisis management.” This lack of baseline knowledge specific to threat assessment is consistent
with statements made by AP 1, who stated:
When I first got promoted to an AP, I attended my first threat assessment and to be
honest, I didn’t even know threat assessment even existed. As a classroom teacher, I
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mean, it could have been something that was told to us, but I didn’t even know there was
a thing like threat assessment.
This also aligns with data collected through the state mandated Virginia Secondary
School Climate Survey. Teachers and staff at all public high schools in Virginia were asked
“Does your school use a formal threat assessment process to respond to student threats of
violence?” (Cornell et al., 2020, p. 77). State level data would represent all high schools in 132
school divisions in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Table 4 provides the response to that
question as reported in the state level technical report, the school level report at JDHS, and the
division level report where JDHS is located. The survey conducted at JDHS as a part of the state
mandated Climate Report was completed by 50 teacher participants and 12 staff participants.
Table 4
Responses to the Question: Does your school use a formal threat assessment process to respond
to threats of violence?
Data Source
Yes
No
State
59%
2%
Division
55%
2%
JDHS
55%
3%
Note. 2020 Virginia Secondary School Climate Survey Report.

I don’t know
39%
43%
39%

The Climate Survey Report does not separate responses based on the employee role,
however, the survey conducted as the quantitative component of this research asked a similar
question of support staff assigned to JDHS. Their responses are provided in Table 5.
Table 5
JDHS Support Staff Survey Results of Question 5
Question 5
Prior to this training, were you aware of the
requirement for threat assessment teams?

Yes

No

I don’t know

14%

86%

0.00%
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Similarly, when support staff were asked during the focus group to describe what would
constitute conducting a threat assessment their responses suggested they were not familiar with
recognizing aberrant or concerning behavior. Their responses focused on “outside visitors
coming in,” “a shooting,” metal detectors,” “lockdown drills,” “safety on the bus,” “sporting
events at the school,” and “after hours when security is not checking visitors on the computer.”
While these topics have a relationship to school safety and certainly require awareness, they are
not related to the recognition of aberrant or threatening behavior and not a component in the
threat assessment process. Considering only 14% of support staff indicated an awareness of
threat assessment on the JDHS Support Staff Survey it is consistent with the responses collected
during the focus group.
Theme 4: Communication. For threat assessment teams to address a potential concern
and appropriately manage the situation they must have knowledge it exists. Communication was
identified as a theme considering the need to report and receive threats. In addition, the code
“trust” was identified as important based on the belief the threat would be appropriately
addressed.
Reporting threats. When the interview participants were asked how threats were
reported they all identified that administration would be contacted. Teacher 1 stated, “well,
definitely the school resource officer.” While this response is not incorrect, she used a
suspicious vehicle in the parking lot as a threat assessment example. This clearly supports theme
three as it relates to defining a threat and the discrepancies identified in properly defining a
threat. Coordinator 1 described the school division tip line which he described as “an
anonymous reporting system and it allows anybody to report a concern to us and they can under
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the app, they can select what school they’re attributing it to, or it can very generalized and just
say the district.” Coordinator 1 was clearly familiar with the division anonymous reporting
system; however, this was not the case based on the responses from the support staff in the focus
group. The group did not respond when asked the questions and when it was defined Para 4
stated, “half the building you have no signal.” Several other participants nodded their heads and
made statements of agreement that cell phone usage was severely limited within the school
building at JDHS. Their responses seemed to suggest they viewed the anonymous reporting
system as an alternative to a 911, or crisis response system.
Receiving threats. Interview participants were asked to describe what occurs when a
threat is received and AP 1 and AP 2 both indicated they would consult with the principal. AP 2
stated, “depending on where the original source came from, for the threat, definitely want to
investigate with other students in the building” and that “the SRO is involved in a lot of that
questioning piece.” AP 2 went on to say, “involve the parents in that investigation, hey, does
that student have access to firearms?” As a law enforcement officer, SRO 1 has the capacity to
investigate a threat with a greater scope of resources and authority and his statements highlighted
why someone with law enforcement expertise is a required threat assessment team member
based on legislation. SRO 1 provided the following statement when asked about how threats are
reported to law enforcement from the school:
I hear from the grade level administrator. It’s kind of like the first point of contact. Now
if I received a threat from an outside source, like social media, I have notified the admin
team in the middle of the night. I’ll get a hit on something, or somebody is making a
report of a threat on social media. That’s where, you know, that’s kind of like my role.
I’m the liaison between, um, that bridge between law enforcement and the school system,
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so I’ve called the principal at eight o’clock at night, like hey, this is what we have, and
I’m getting dresses and I’m headed out, trying to adjust the situation.
Social media. The use of social media was discussed as a contributing problem
associated with communicating and sharing threats. AP 2 shared concerns with the TikTok
challenges that have led to increases in behaviors that require an investigation and often result in
consequences. Coordinator 1 shared an incident that occurred at the beginning of the 2021-2022
school year in a nearby school division that involved a student that shot and wounded two
students in the school. This led to several social media posts claiming a school shooting would
occur the following day at JDHS. While these incidents provided to be false, it still required an
investigation and working with local law enforcement and the FBI to assess the credibility.
Furthermore, the sharing of the false claims on social media led to significant miscommunication
by students and parents according to Coordinator 1.
Trust. AP 2 shared the importance of trust by the school community “that when they go
to that person that they know it’s going to be follow through.” He went on to state, “any of those
members of the threat assessment team that I named, if a staff person or support staff person
comes and delivers that information, they have trust that it’s going to go where it needs to go to
next.” AP1 shared that “a lot of our teachers, support staff are comfortable going directly to our
SRO with that information, because then of course they are going to immediately inform the
administration.”
Sub-question 2:
Sub-question two for this study was, “How would support staff in a focus group solve the
problem of inadequately trained support staff in the recognition of threatening or aberrant
behavior that may represent a threat to the community, self, or others at John Doe High School
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located in southeast Virginia?” The goal of the focus group was to learn their current perception
of threat assessment at JDHS, the types of training they receive, preferred training modalities,
and where gaps may exist. The focus group was composed of four school security officers, four
paraprofessionals, one speech therapist, and one substitute teacher. The group was assembled in
the library at JDHS with the assistance of the school administrator during an early release day for
students. The library was free of distractions and afforded the opportunity to maintain social
distancing and develop dialogue based on a series of 10 guiding questions. The focus group
discussion was recorded using Otter AI, while notes were taken to record any information not
captured by the audio recording.
The transcript was compared with the audio recording and individual speakers were
identified and attributed to the correct text. The updated transcript was imported into NVivo
qualitative analysis software. Individual passages of text were identified and sorted into 18
individual codes, which were then organized into the four themes identified during the analysis
of the threat assessment team interviews. The four themes, corresponding codes and their
frequency can be found in Table 6.
Table 6
Support Staff Focus Group Themes and Frequency of Codes
Theme
Training Challenges

Codes
Virtual Training Preference
Training Relevance
Lack of Training
In-person training preference
Hybrid with Shadowing
Hybrid training preference

Frequency
4
3
13
2
1
3

Impact of COVID-19

Mental Health

3

Types of Threats
Physical Security

13
10

Defining Threat Assessment
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Communication

Outside School Hours
Observational Documentation
Incorrect Definition of Threat
Concerning Behavior
After School Events

5
1
17
5
4

Valued Employee
Special Education
Silos
Reporting a Threat

12
1
4
7

Theme 1: Training challenges. The challenges to providing professional development
were significant based on the group consensus. There were no statements that contradicted what
was learned through the threat assessment team interviews, however, there were codes that
varied with the frequency of references. The perception of the focus group that their role, or
position, was a significant factor in why they did not receive communication from teachers or
administration. They felt this led to silos existing and reduced their ability to identify behaviors
that should be reported. This was not identified during the interviews and the concerns around
communication were primarily due to reporting or receiving threats. It is important to note that
the interview group was composed of a central office coordinator, two assistant principals, and
SRO, and a teacher. However, the focus group was composed of support staff, primarily SSOs
and paraprofessionals. These two groups clearly perform very different roles within the school
community, so it was expected that there would be variations on their perceptions.
Lack of training. The type of training and amount varied substantially between the SSOs
and the paraprofessionals. SSOs are required to be certified through the DCJS using the state
approved curriculum that is a two-day course and requires 16 hours of relevant in-service every
two years (Regulations Relating to School Security Officers, 2015). The job duties and types of
training SSOs lends itself to content that requires a physical security lens. Paraprofessionals,
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also referred to as teacher assistants, provide support to special education students based on the
students’ Individualized Education Program (IEP). Their professional development is typically
provided through central office and relates to special education according to Coordinator 1.
Training specific to threat assessment was not received by support staff in this focus group based
on their dialogue, which is consistent with findings in the interview. Findings from the survey of
support staff did indicate that five (24%) of the participants reported having receiving threat
assessment training. However, it is important to note that six of the 21 participants are SSOs and
threat assessment is briefly discussed during the certification training to be employed in that role,
which may account for the reported training.
Virtual and in-person training preference. The focus group was asked about their
preferences in how they receive training, whether in-person or through a virtual platform. SSO 3
stated, “I have 100,000 things going on, no matter where I’m at, whether it’s here. So, I’m gonna
hear half of it.” When virtual training was discussed SSO 1 stated, “I’m going to go to sleep.”
SSO 4 indicated “yeah, I’m in-person.” SSO 2 stated, “it’s sitting in front of a computer all day.
It’s boring.” Interestingly, all the SSOs indicated a preference with in-person training, however,
the paraprofessionals indicated a preference for virtual or a hybrid model. Para 3 stated, “I don’t
mind training. I am a virtual person, but I also would like follow-up.” Para 1 indicated the need
to know “how to apply it to what you’re being trained. So, you need to be able to have a little
Socratic conversation.” The survey data also showed variances in their preferences. When
asked on the survey “I would prefer to receive this training online instead of in-person” there was
a preference towards this online training. Fifty-seven percent (12) stated they strongly agree or
agree, 14% (3) neither agree or disagree, and 29% (6) disagree or strongly disagree. However, it
is important to note that 95% (20) of the respondents on the survey indicated the length of the
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training was appropriate and one respondent selected “neither agree or disagree.” It is unknown
from the data collected the significance of length of training. Para 4 provided a completely
different approach as outlined below:
I think I would pick something else. For me, I like the option of the online because I feel
like I can go as fast as I need to. If I need to slow something down. I think I’d prefer like,
actually, like on the job shadow training. It’s one thing to see a bunch of videos of
extreme case scenarios that almost never happen a lot. Can I shadow someone and ask an
actual person what they would do? That would be more effective for me.
Theme 2: Impact of COVID-19. During the focus group discussion COVID-19 was
not mentioned as often and in the same context as during the interviews. None of the questions
specifically asked about the impact of COVID-19 and it was only addressed with respect to their
perception of increased mental health concerns. Since this theme was not anticipated during the
development of the focus group questions it was not explicitly asked. However, responses to
other questions indicated a perceived increase in mental health concerns following the return to
in-person instruction.
Mental Health. Para 2 was referring to the return to in-person instruction and expressed
an increase in certain behaviors. She stated, “a disgruntled student, or disgruntled parent . . .
usually go from zero to one hundred in no time and then they make threats. Para 1 followed that
statement up with noticing students are “very withdrawn.” These statements are consistent with
the general sentiment by the interview participants when discussing the impact of COVID-19
and the challenges to the return of school.
Theme 3: Defining threat assessment. A consistent theme across the interview and
focus findings was how threat assessment was defined. Support staff certainly demonstrated a
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greater lack of understanding in what constituted a threat and the purpose of a threat assessment
team. Seven codes were identified based on the responses from the focus group to form this
theme. Three codes in particular represented 40 out of 55 of references within this theme, which
are described below.
Types of threats. The types of threats described by the focus group primarily addressed
concerns with outside threats that could potentially enter the school. Multiple examples were
shared, to include “outside visitors,” “a shooting,” “kids carrying a bag,” “sporting events,”
“lunch and in between classes,” and “carrying odd things around.” SSO 4, who has previously
worked for 21 years as a school bus driver for the school division shared her concerns with
“what kids can carry on the bus.” Para 3 identified threats of suicide, which is one of the
situations a threat assessment team would convene.
Incorrect definition of threat. Prior to conducting this research, it was anticipated very
few support staff would have had training in the recognition and awareness of threatening or
aberrant behavior. The findings from all three data collection methods confirmed this to be the
case. Focus group participants primarily associated a threat in the context of physical security
and responding to an act of targeted violence. Para 1 described “lockdown drills” as a type of
threat assessment. SSO 4 expressed concerns “if somebody came on the bus with a gun.” The
examples provided primarily represented actions that would occur without intervention by a
threat assessment team, as opposed to examples that a threat assessment team could avert.
Physical security. Many examples of threat assessment focused on physical security
measures that schools have in place or could have in place as a preventive or response measure.
There was a lengthy discussion by several support staff participants about the use of metal
detectors. There were concerns that students walk can walk through a metal detector, but their
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bags do not pass through the metal detector. However, JDHS does not utilize metal detectors at
the school, so it is unknown why staff shared so many concerns about how they are used. There
are metal detectors available for many sporting events.
Theme 4: Communication. The theme of communication varied somewhat with the
identified codes when compared to the interview participant group. The most significant and
unexpected finding from the focus group was the sentiment of their value as an employee. The
focus group expressed strong feelings regarding to how others viewed their role at JDHS. The
focus group felt their opinion was not valued since they were not teachers. They also believed
that information was not shared with them because they felt that others saw them in a lesser role.
They seemed to perceive that there was a hierarchy that existed between administration, teachers,
and support staff.
Silos. Identifying scattered information from varied sources is central to effective threat
assessment (DCJS, 2020). The unintended consequence of the organizational structure of
schools, like any organization, can lead to silos. This can lead to a “excessively insular mindset
or mentality through which these boundaries shape behaviors and ways of working that inhibit
cross-boundary collaboration and cooperation” (de Waal, Weaver, Day, & van der Heijden,
2019, p. 2). Focus group participants identified examples of information that because of the
perception of silos is not communicated. Para 2 stated, “we don’t know about this one that is a
known problem, like you’re late to the party.” The concern with silos was not expressed by the
threat assessment team participants during interviews, however, the individuals that form the
team typically have a more holistic view of the school due to their role.
Reporting a threat. When asked who they would report a threat to they all responding
either verbally, or by a nod of the head that they let administration know. Para 1 stated, “in my
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experience I’ve had to make several reports for various situations. If it’s an imminent physical
threat, depending on where I am, it’s usually phone calls to security.” Other statements included
“call security,” “call the office,” “call an admin and do level one, two, three, go,” “whatever
administrator is nearby,” and “it depends on the situation.” These responses do not necessarily
indicate the capacity to recognize threatening or aberrant behavior, however, it does suggest
knowledge on how to report what they perceive to be a threat.
Valued employee. This code was not anticipated and there were no questions intended to
reveal this as a finding, however, there were multiple comments that were coded into 12
references. When these comments were made there were verbal affirmations of agreement and
head nods from the entire participant group. The general sentiment was a perception that
teachers and administrative staff do not apply the same value to support staff. Select comments
to support this sentiment include “I think a lot of times how it gets kicked off as, oh you’re just a
teacher assistant,” “and not that we should have you know, all this authority, but you know our
job is to assist,” and “we have no voice and then we don’t have some of the skill set to bring to
the table and it’s not respected. The things that we see in the classroom can get shoved away
quickly.” This same sentiment appeared in response to training and included “when I started, I
even asked for special training because we had a student that tended to be kind of violent and I
was denied because I was told that it was special for a special department and I can’t get that.”
Para 2 responded to a statement about a school safety conference an SSO attended by stating, “I
was going to say it was never offered to us.” Para 3 expressed that when training is provided “it
reinforces that you’re a professional doing a job.”
The notion of feeling valued as an employee is certainly important for many reasons,
however, it seemed to garner the greatest degree of discussion and emotion during the focus
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group discussion. In fact, after the interview was completed every single person stayed to
continue to ask questions and share their concerns. While not captured in the transcript it was
noted that there was a sense that there was a desire for validation by support staff and this focus
group may have offered the opportunity. It certainly raised additional questions that will not be
answered within the scope of this research, however, would be potentially useful in a future
study. The survey conducted did indicate that 86% of support staff “strongly agreed” the online
“training is important for my role at the school” and 5% “agreed.”
Sub-question 3:
Sub-questions three for this study was, “How would an online training module and posttraining survey data solve the problem of inadequately trained support staff in the recognition of
threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to the community, self, or others at
John Doe High School located in southeast Virginia?” To solve this problem an online training
module was developed based on the Threat Assessment and Management in Virginia Public
Schools: Model Policies, Procedures, and Guidelines which was established by the Virginia
Department of Criminal Justice Services to guide school divisions in the Commonwealth of
Virginia (DCJS, 2020). This document is the basis for the establishment of threat assessment
teams, legislative requirements, identifying and assessing threats, and managing cases through
intervention. The basis of all DCJS threat assessment training is established by these model
policies.
The researcher converted select relevant content from the model policies into a
storyboard that was adapted into a self-paced learning module that was approximately 15
minutes in length. The module was accessed through a link that went to a landing page where
both the module could be easily accessed and viewed by the participant. The link to the training
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module is https://dcjsthreatassessmentmodule.com/. The training module considered content that
would be beneficial and engaging for the role of support staff while considering adult learning
strategies and pedagogy.
An anonymous survey was constructed using Survey Monkey with IRB approved
questions. The survey consisted of 19 questions, with the first five included to collect minimal
demographic information about role, experience in the division and at JDHS, and prior
knowledge about threat assessment requirements and threat assessment training. Questions one
through five are outlined below:
1. Which job title best describes your current role?
a. school security officer
b. bus driver
c. paraprofessional/ instructional assistant
d. office staff/ administrative staff
e. custodial staff
f. other (please specify)
2. How many years have you worked in this school division?
a. 0-5 years
b. 6-10 years
c. 11-15 years
d. 16-20 years
e. 21 or more years
3. How many years have you worked at this school?
a. 0-5 years
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b. 6-10 years
c. 11-15 years
d. 16-20 years
e. 21 or more years
4. Prior to this training, have you ever received behavioral threat assessment training?
a. Yes
b. No
d. I don’t know
5. Prior to this training, were you aware of the requirement for threat assessment teams?
a. Yes
b. No
c. I don’t know
The composition of the survey participants represented school security officers (6), bus
driver (2), paraprofessional/ instructional assistant (5), office staff/ administrative assistant (3),
custodial staff (2), and other (3). Respondents that selected other had the option to enter their
role. The manual entry indicated two substitute teachers and one coach. Most participants had
spent their entire time at JDHS while working in the school division. Fifty-two percent (11) of
respondents indicated they have worked at JDHS between “0-5 years,” 33% (7) between “6-10
years,” 10% (2) “11-15 years,” and 5% (1) “16-20 years.” When asked about previously
receiving behavioral threat assessment training 24% (5) indicated “yes,” 67% (14) “no,” and 9%
(2) “I do not know.” When asked about previously being aware of the requirement for threat
assessment teams 14% (3) indicated “yes” and 86% (18) “no.” All responses to questions one
through four are outlined for all 21 participants by role in Table 7.
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Table 7
Survey Participants (Experience, TA Training, and Awareness)
Role
Bus Driver 1
Substitute 1
SSO 1
Office Staff 1
SSO 2
Para 1
Para 2
Office Staff 2
Custodian 1
Para 3
SSO 3
SSO 4
Substitute 2
Para 4
Coach 1
SSO 5
Custodian 2
Bus Driver 2
Para 5
Office Staff 3
SSO 6

Years in
Division

Years at JDHS

Prior TA
Training

6-10
10-15
0-5
11-15
0-5
6-10
6-10
21 or more
16-20
6-10
0-5
6-10
0-5
11-15
0-5
0-5
6-10
0-5
11-15
11-15
6-10

6-10
0-5
0-5
11-15
0-5
6-10
6-10
11-15
16-20
6-10
0-5
0-5
0-5
6-10
0-5
0-5
6-10
0-5
6-10
0-5
0-5

No
No
No
No
I Don’t Know
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
I Don’t Know
Yes
No
No

Awareness of
TA
Requirements
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No

Questions six through nineteen measured the respondents’ perception of the effectiveness
of the online training module in improving their recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior
that may represent a threat to the community, self, or others by using a five-point Likert scale.
The scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The survey results were
imported into Excel to calculate the mean of questions six through nineteen based on the fivepoint Likert scale. Table 8 provides the mean response for each item.
Table 8
Mean of Survey Responses Following Completion of the Online Training Module
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Survey Question
6. This training improved my awareness of the requirement for threat assessment
teams in Virginia schools.

Mean
4.57

7. This training is important for my role at the school.

4.67

8. After completing this training, I realize that I have observed or heard something at
school in the past that may have been threatening or aberrant behavior.

4.43

9. After completing this training, I feel better prepared to recognize threatening or
aberrant behavior.

4.67

10. If I had a concern about a student or another individual in the school community,
I would know how to report it at my school.

4.71

11. After completing this training, I feel more confident of when to report
threatening or aberrant behavior.

4.76

12. I am comfortable in reporting threatening or aberrant behavior at my school.

4.67

13. The length of the training was appropriate.

4.48

14. I would prefer to receive this training online instead of in-person.

3.67

15. This online training module was easy to understand.

4.67

16. I believe all support staff should receive this training.

4.67

17. The use of scenarios in this training helped me to understand threatening or
aberrant behavior.

4.33

18. I would like to learn more about behavioral threat assessment.

4.24

19. This training makes me feel like a valuable part of my school community.
4.10
Note. Five-point Likert scale: 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (neither agree or disagree), 4
(agree), and 5 (strongly agree).
Theme 1: Training challenges. Focus group and interview findings indicate one of the
limitations of providing training is availability of time. Question 13 “the length of the training
was appropriate” received a mean score of 4.48, which could suggest the use of short training
modules as a solution to limited availability of time. This module was approximately 15 minutes
in length. Training delivery was identified as a code in both the interview and focus group data,
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with a focus on virtual, in-person, or a hybrid model to providing professional development. The
school division has a learning management system to provide professional development,
however, the focus group presented mixed opinions on preference. After further discussion, a
hybrid model was generally agreed to be the preferred method. Question 14 asked respondents if
they “would prefer to receive this training online instead of in-person” and the mean was 3.67,
which was the lowest mean score in this dataset. A mean of 3.67 would still indicate they
“agree” with the question of “would prefer to receive this training online instead of in-person,”
however, the question was specific to the training module they had just completed. It is
unknown based on the response to that question with they would prefer all trainings to be online
instead of in-person.
Theme 2: Defining threat assessment. The capacity to identify threat assessment was
seen as inconsistent during interviews and the post-training survey. The online training module
provided numerous examples of aberrant behavior and the purpose of conducting a threat
assessment. The survey revealed that only five respondents had received threat assessment prior
to the online training module, while 14 had not, and 2 indicated “I do not know.” When asked
about whether they were aware of the requirement for threat assessment teams 18 indicated “no”
and three indicated “yes.”
Theme 3: Impact of COVID-19. The survey was developed in the fall of 2020 and was
approved by IRB in spring of 2021, therefore, questions related to the impact of COVID-19 were
not considered. This primarily due to the failure to anticipate the longevity of the pandemic and
the varied response at the federal, state, and local levels. This survey did not have the capacity to
inform this theme in a meaningful manner.
Theme 4: Communication. There were several questions in the survey that elicit
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responses that correspond to codes identified in the interviews and focus group. Questions eight
through eleven on the post-training survey addresses the topics of reporting threats, which was
also identified frequently and coded during interviews and the focus group as an area that is
necessary for effective threat assessment. See Table 9 for a crosswalk of survey questions and
codes that their identified from the interviews and focus group analysis.
Table 9
Crosswalk of Survey Questions with Select Codes
Interview Codes

Focus Group
Codes

*Training
Delivery

*Training
Relevance

*Support Staff
TA Training
*Reporting
Threats

*Training
Relevance
*Valued
Employee

8. After completing this training, I realize that I have
observed or heard something at school in the past that
may have been threatening or aberrant behavior.

*Reporting
Threats

*Reporting
Threats

9. After completing this training, I feel better prepared to
recognize threatening or aberrant behavior.

*Reporting
Threats

*Reporting
Threats

10. If I had a concern about a student or another
individual in the school community, I would know how
to report it at my school.

*Reporting
Threats

*Reporting
Threats

*Reporting
Threats

*Reporting
Threats

12. I am comfortable in reporting threatening or aberrant
behavior at my school.

*Reporting
Threats

*Reporting
Threats

13. The length of the training was appropriate.

*Time/
availability

None

Survey Questions
6. This training improved my awareness of the
requirement for threat assessment teams in Virginia
schools.
7. This training is important for my role at the school.

11. After completing this training, I feel more confident
of when to report threatening or aberrant behavior.
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14. I would prefer to receive this training online instead
of in-person.

*Training
Delivery
*None

*Virtual
Training
Preference
*In-person
training

*Training
Delivery

*Training
Relevance

*Support Staff
TA Training

*Valued
Employee

17. The use of scenarios in this training helped me to
understand threatening or aberrant behavior.

*Complementary
Training

*Types of
Threats

18. I would like to learn more about behavioral threat
assessment.

*Threat Cases

*Concerning
Behavior

*Trust

*Valued
Employee

15. This online training module was easy to understand.
16. I believe all support staff should receive this
training.

19. This training makes me feel like a valuable part of
my school community.
Note. Tables 3 and 6 lists themes and corresponding codes.

Discussion
The implementation of behavioral threat assessment in K-12 schools seek to identify and
intervene with an individual that may be on the pathway to violence. Threat assessment is only
effective when the capacity for the identification of threatening or aberrant behavior exists in the
school community. The empirical and theoretical literature outlined in Chapter two provides the
framework for increasing that capacity and are supported by findings of this applied study.
Those findings were informed through threat assessment team interviews, a support staff focus
group, and the development and implementation of an online threat assessment training module
followed by a post-training survey. The resulting data were analyzed and organized into themes
that emerged across all three data sources. These themes confirm and build upon the existing
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literature.
Theoretical Literature
Social control theory served as the guiding framework for the development of this
research. A critical feature of threat assessment is the recognition of threatening and aberrant
behavior. While threatening behavior if frequently explicit and often observable, aberrant
behavior may present as the absence of a particular behavior (National Threat Assessment
Center, 2019). Social control theories consider why an individual conforms with established
norms, as opposed to why they may deviate from those norms (Akers & Sellers, 2013). School
violence is typically perpetrated by individuals that display weak social bonds (Pittaro, 2007).
The qualitative and quantitative analysis of this applied study supports the findings in the
theoretical and empirical literature.
Social bond theory. The most recognized social control theory is social bond theory by
Travis Hirschi and it was an attempt to determine why people behave outside of acceptable
norms (Bouffard & Rice, 2010). The notion that weak social bonds contribute to deviant
behavior is rooted in the components of attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief as
crucial to creating a social bond (Pittaro, 2007). These four components are observable and may
indicate the need for intervention; however, it is important to recognize the presentation of a
weak social bond does not indicate an individual is homicidal or suicidal.
Attachment. This component is significant to connectedness to the school community
and is often considered to be the strongest indicator of a strong social bond (Pittaro, 2007). The
lack of attachment is observable and according to Silver et al (2018) that on average, active
shooters displayed four to five “concerning behaviors over time that were observable to others
around the shooter” (p. 7). During the focus group Para 1 identified “a very withdrawn person”
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as someone that may be cause for concern. The focus group did recognize that signs of a
“withdrawn person” may be typical behavior that is not cause for concern; however, if this
behavior was new or worsening it should be reported for assessment. When conducting a threat
assessment the team responds to a series of questions to assess the threat. One question the team
considers is “does the subject have a positive, trusting, sustained relationship with at least one
responsible person” (DCJS, 2020, p. 37). An individual with a weak social bond of attachment
would likely not demonstrate that level of relationship.
The online training module provided an overview of what may be considered threatening
or aberrant behavior. The post-training survey indicated 57% (12) of the participants selected
“strongly agree” and 33% (7) selected “agree” when asked “After completing this training, I
realize that I may have observed or heard something at school in the past that may have been
threatening or aberrant behavior.” The online training module developed for this applied study
addresses what behaviors may indicate an individual is potentially presenting with a weak
attachment to the school community. Not only does this training provide potential warning
signs, but it also highlights the importance of developing a capacity for awareness and reporting.
The entire school community, including support staff, benefits when it observes, identifies, and
reports concerning behavior. Between 2008 and 2017 a study was conducted on 41 acts of
targeted school violence found that in every case the “attacker exhibited concerning behaviors”
and “most communicated their intent to attack” (National Threat Assessment Center, 2019, p.
52). Furthermore, Vossekuil et al. (2002) identified that “most attackers engaged in some
behavior prior to the incident that caused others concern or indicated a need for help” (p. 31).
A significant finding that was consistent among support staff during the focus group and
those that were surveyed was an inaccurate understanding of threatening and/or aberrant
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behavior in the context of threat assessment. This also included interview participant Teacher 1
was a newly assigned threat assessment team member. Defining Threat Assessment was a
significant theme identified across all three data collections with 126 codes identified. It is
important to note there was no behavioral threat assessment training provided based on
statements made during the focus group. At the time of the interview Teacher 1 was scheduled
to attend an eight-hour threat assessment training offered virtually by DCJS; however, there was
no previous training prior to her assignment to a threat assessment team. The post-training
survey revealed similar results when 67% (14) and 9% (2) of support staff participants indicated
“no” and “I do not know,” respectively, when asked if they have “ever received behavioral threat
assessment training.”
Commitment. The bond of commitment is the pursuit towards school, career, or a goal
that is attained by effort on the part of the individual. Commitment often results in a shared goal
with others, which has the potential to allow for attachment to others (Pittaro, 2007). One of the
key questions threat assessment teams answer to assess the propensity for violence states, “is the
subject experiencing hopelessness, desperation, and/or despair” (DCJS, 2020, p. 36). Individuals
that are experiencing hopelessness or despair can be indicative of someone that is not only
homicidal, but suicidal (Vossekuil et al., 2004). Students with a weak social bond of
commitment may not engage in activities that would lead to a post-secondary goal, which could
be identified through a review of academic history and reporting by classroom teachers and
support staff. Furthermore, students that demonstrate a lack of commitment often experience
hopelessness (Buzzai, Sorrenti, Orecchio, Marino, & Filippello, 2020). As identified under
attachment, training provided to staff to recognize what may appear as low motivation, lack of
engagement, or hopelessness could potentially lead to an intervention with positive results.
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Complementary training to threat assessment training was identified by the interview
group as beneficial to identifying aberrant behavior and conducting threat assessments.
Coordinator 1 shared the importance of “studying prior events” and “looking at prior case
studies, such as Parkland.” Mental health related training was cited as beneficial by participants
of the interviews and the focus group.
Involvement. The social bond of involvement through academics, social relationships,
and activities typically requires some level of commitment and attachment. Pittaro (2007)
suggests if an individual is involved in these activities he or she would not have time to engage
in criminal behavior. Again, increasing the capacity to recognize and report what may be
considered a concern or aberrant behavior would likely result in earlier intervention. For
example, the individuals responsible for the Columbine High School mass attack of 1999 were
not involved in the school community, lacked attachment to their peers and teachers, and there
was no evidence of commitment to a goal beyond high school (Ogle, Eckman, & Leslie, 2003).
Belief. This social bond requires and individual to accept that the rules are acceptable
and applicable. Often, those who demonstrate non-compliance, whether a law, rule, or norm,
often rationalize their behavior. The first step on the pathway to violence is the formation of a
grievance, or perceived grievance that in some individuals can lead to rationalizing their
behavior and reducing empathy towards others (Meloy et al., 2015). In the school setting this
could manifest as repeated violations of the student code of conduct, exclusionary discipline, or
bullying behavior towards peers. Identifying non-compliance does not require training;
however, it is far more difficult to assess what is typical adolescent non-compliance and the
rationalization of behavior that has the potential for violence to self or others.
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School-based victimization. Many individuals that ultimately completed an act of
targeted violence at schools indicated they “felt bullied, persecuted or injured by others prior to
the attack” (Vossekuil et al., 2002, p. 31). It is theorized that victimization leads to a weaker
bond in individuals, which can increase the likelihood of deviant behavior (Hirschi, 2002; Popp
& Peguero, 2012). Students that are bullied are less likely to feel connected to the school
community and may have weaker social bonds than students who are not bullied; consequently,
this could attribute to increased deviant behavior in some people (Cecen-Celik & Keith, 2019).
Experiencing school-based victimization can lead to a grievance towards an individual, a
group, or society in general. If grievance progresses to ideation the individual may develop
fantasies that enact some degree of revenge. Further development can lead to planning how to
enact revenge through targeted violence, which includes identifying methods for carrying out the
act. The fourth step is preparation, and this is when the individual acquires what is needed to
complete the targeted violence. The final step is implementation, which is an attempt to
complete the act. These five steps represent the pathway to violence (Modzeleski & Randazzo,
2018). These five steps represent an opportunity for any number of individuals to identify a
behavior that causes concern or is representative of aberrant behavior. “Incidents of targeted
violence at school rarely were sudden, impulsive acts” (Vossekuil et al., 2002, p. 31). As a
result, these warning signs are observable well before the latter stages of the pathway to
violence.
Empirical Literature
A review of the existing literature confirmed current guidance provided by the DCJS to
Virginia schools on behavioral threat assessment is rooted in research and best practice (DCJS,
2020; Modzeleski & Randazzo, 2018; Vossekuil et al., 2004). The purpose of this applied study
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was to solve the problem of inadequately trained support staff in the recognition of threatening or
aberrant behavior; however, the solution to the problem does not solely rest with increasing the
capacity of support staff to recognize threatening behavior. A review of the empirical literature
and the data collected through this applied study revealed several key considerations to solving
the problem within the four themes identified.
Theme 1: training challenges. The challenges identified in the literature to providing
employee training are consistent with the findings from the qualitative and quantitative research
conducted. Findings from focus group statements revealed the importance of training relevance,
time restrictions, and virtual training preferences. These codes were triangulated with research
identified in the literature review and were assessed against previous studies (Gog et al., 2010;
Knowles, 1984; Morgenroth, 2017; Pic, 2015; Scott et al., 2016). Sub-question 3 proposes an
online training module to solve the problem of inadequately trained support staff, so the
literature and study findings related to training challenges will focus on virtual training.
Virtual training. During the focus group several participants indicated their perception
of virtual training to be “boring” and found it difficult to “focus.” However, many participants
suggested virtual training was the preferred modality to receiving instruction. Post-training
survey results indicated a similar mixed preference. Twelve respondents preferred to receive this
training online instead of in-person and six did not prefer to receive it online instead of inperson. Three respondents indicated “neither agree nor disagree.” When considering the
development of virtual training it is important to consider the length of the training, engagement
for adult learners, and relevance to their role. The focus group was reporting their perception of
virtual training based on prior experiences, while the survey group was assessing the online
training module developed by the researcher. The focus group did not reveal what previous
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online training they had received and whether it was consistent with research that indicates
virtual learning should consider length of training, engagement, and convenience (Gog et al.,
2010; Knowles, 1984; Pic, 2015; Scott et al., 2016). However, despite developing a training
module that considered the literature the post-training survey group six of the 21 participants
preferred that training as in-person. Further research would need to be considered to assess what
additional factors may have led to a preference for in-person training, even though the best
practices found in the literature were applied. A potential factor that should be explored is the
impact of social interaction with in-person instruction, however, the literature was not evaluated
as a possible factor in training preference.
Length of training. The preferred length of time is between 15 and 30 minutes
(Morgenroth, 2017). The online threat assessment training module developed for this study was
approximately 15 minutes and based on the post-training survey 52% (11) respondents selected
“strongly agree” when asked if the “length of the training was appropriate,” 43% (9) selected
“agree,” and five percent (1) selected “neither agree nor disagree.” The results from the posttraining survey were consistent with findings from Morgenroth (2017).
Engagement. The literature identifies factors such as comfort with the virtual platform,
negative experiences with previous online training, and maintaining engagement with adult
learners as considerations when developing online training modules (Pic, 2015). The posttraining survey indicated that 67% (14) “strongly agree” and 33% (7) “agree” the threat
assessment “online training module was easy to understand.” The online training module was
based on adult learning best practice identified by Pic (2015) and based on the post-training
survey results the participants found the module easy to understand.
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Relevance. Training must be relevant to the position to achieve buy-in from the learner.
“Learning that is imposed on adults will be met with resentment and is minimally effective”
(Gog et al., 2010, p. 228). Adult learners are motivated to learn, but it is based on whether they
find it necessary (Knowles, 1984). Focus group participants expressed the desire to gain training
that would improve their effectiveness. The post-training survey results indicated 67% (14)
“strongly agree” and 33% (7) “agree” with the statement “I believe all support staff should
receive this training.” The findings from the post-training and statements revealed during the
focus group were consistent with Gog et al. (2010) and Knowles (1984).
Theme 2: impact of COVID-19. The literature review was developed prior to the
COVID-19 pandemic; however, mental health concerns were raised numerous times by the
interview and focus group participants due to their belief there were substantial increases due to
the pandemic. Schools have the capacity to identify a student that may need services based on
observation and interaction during the school day. Coordinator 1 indicated during his interview
seeing substantial increases in mental health concerns. While not substantiated through research
as it relates to COVID-19, it is certainly reasonable to suspect that the limitations of in-person
instruction contributed to weak social bonds. Considering there were minimal opportunities for
attachment, involvement, and commitment during the most socially restrictive period of the
pandemic it could have had a negative impact on student mental health.
Theme 3: defining threat assessment. The foundation of behavioral threat assessment
in schools is a result of a collaborative effort by the USSS and the USDOE known as the Safe
School Initiative following the shooting at Columbine High School in 1999 (Vossekuil et al.,
2004). In 2013, Virginia passed legislation requiring all public K-12 schools to have threat
assessment teams composed of individuals with expertise in administration, counseling,
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instruction, and law enforcement (DCJS, 2020). The FBI’ BAU in 2018 examined active shooter
events between 2000 and 2013 to identify pre-attack behaviors to establish preventative steps
(Silver, Simons, & Craun, 2018). These pre-attack behaviors inform current training conducted
by the DCJS for schools and served as the framework for developed the online training module
for support staff.
The current DCJS training and related resources are based on the literature and were
updated in 2020 to reflect additional findings (DCJS, 2020). The interview findings were
generally consistent with participant definition of threat assessment. Teacher 1 did not
accurately understand threat assessment; however, she had been newly assigned to the team and
had not attended training before the interview was conducted. The focus group feedback clearly
demonstrated an inaccurate understanding of threat assessment. The participants primarily
identified physical security threats instead of behavioral threats, however, this is consistent with
what is anecdotally known about threat assessment knowledge outside of the school threat
assessment team.
Theme 4: communication. Communication emerged as a significant theme in the data,
particularly based on identified codes during the focus group. The literature stresses the
importance of communication that occurs by a subject prior to an active attack. These
communications are known as leakage and “could take the form of subtle threats, boasts,
innuendos, predictions, or ultimatums (O’Toole, 1999, p. 16). This is consistent with the DCJS
training that establishes key questions to guide the threat assessment team towards an outcome,
including asking the question “have there been any communications suggesting ideas, intent,
planning or preparation for violence” (DCJS, 2020, p. 36). Social media was identified by
several members of the interview participants as serving as a platform for the communication of
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grievances and threatening statements. Coordinator 1 indicated that all of these require further
investigation, which demands significant time and resources. However, many previous mass
shooters communicated concerning statements on social media platforms that were discovered
after the event occurred (National Threat Assessment Center, 2019).
Summary
The findings from the threat assessment team interviews, support staff focus group, and
the post-training survey data confirmed the assumption that support staff are not adequately
trained to recognize threatening or aberrant behavior. Five interviews were conducted of
members of the threat assessment team and one central office employee, a focus group of 10
support staff was conducted, and 21 support staff participants completed an online threat
assessment training module developed by the researcher that included a survey with 19 items.
Coding conducted of the interviews and focus group identified 36 codes that emerged to
establish four themes. Most of the codes were consistent with the findings in the empirical
literature (DCJS, 2020; Modzeleski & Randazzo, 2018; Vossekuil et al., 2004). However, the
code “valued employee” identified during the focus group was unexpected and certainly suggests
the need for further research and what previous literature may indicate. The survey results
suggest the online training module was useful in increasing awareness of threat assessment,
recognition of aberrant behavior, relevant to the role of support staff, easy to understand, and
most respondents preferred this training in an online format. Chapter five will propose a solution
to the central question based on the findings in this chapter, identify needed resources and
funding, and any potential barriers.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
Overview
The purpose of this applied study was to solve the problem of inadequately trained
support staff in the recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to
the community, self, or others at John Doe High School located in southeast Virginia by
developing and implementing online training modules. A multimethod design was used
consisting of qualitative and quantitative approaches. The problem is John Doe High School is
not adequately providing guidance and training to support staff in the recognition of threatening
or aberrant behavior that may represent a threat to the community, self, or others. To find a
solution to this problem the researcher interviewed threat assessment team members, conducted a
focus group composed of support staff, and developed an online training module and survey
instrument. The online training module provided support staff a brief training specific to
behavioral threat assessment and how to recognize and report a threat based on current protocols
at JDHS. The online training module was followed by a survey that attempted to measure the
participants’ perception of whether it improved their understanding of behavioral threat
assessment. Chapter 5 provides solutions to the problem of providing adequate training to
support staff to increase their capacity to recognize threatening or aberrant behavior that may
represent a threat to the community, self, or others at JDHS. Goals and objectives are presented
that address the current gaps, followed by potential resources needed, and funding requirements.
The chapter concludes with identifying individuals responsible for the initiative, a proposed
timeline for implementation, potential barriers, and an evaluation plan to assess effectiveness.
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Restatement of the Problem
This applied study attempted to identify solutions to adequately address the problem of
providing guidance and training to support staff in the recognition of threatening or aberrant
behavior that may represent a threat to the community, self, or others. Based on the Virginia
Secondary Climate Survey results, this is not a problem that is unique to JDHS or the school
division (Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services [DCJS], 2020). This problem
extends beyond support staff and includes teachers based on state Climate Survey data and
findings revealed during the interviews with threat assessment team members.
Proposed Solution to the Central Question
The central question of this applied study asks, “How can the problem of providing
adequate training to support staff to increase their capacity to recognize threatening or aberrant
behavior that may represent a threat to the community, self, or others be solved at John Doe High
School located in southeast Virginia be improved?” The solution to the central question requires
the implementation of adequate training on behavioral threat assessment for support staff. To
minimize barriers identified in the literature and the findings from the quantitative and
qualitative analysis the recommended goals and supporting objectives are suggested:
Goal 1: conduct relevant and consistent training for support staff to improve their
ability to recognize threatening or aberrant behavior. Goal 1 addresses the four themes that
emerged during analysis of the data. The primary solution focuses on providing training to
support staff that is not only accessible, but relevant to improving their capacity to recognize
threatening or aberrant behavior.
Objective 1: develop a blended training model that includes in-person and virtual
training. The availability of time to participate in training was identified as a barrier by support

122
staff and interview participants. Support staff are contracted wage employees and hours outside
of their contract requires compensation, which could present challenges if not earmarked as an
expenditure. There are several days on the school calendar that students are not in attendance.
These days should be identified in advance to schedule in-person training.
The use of virtual microlessons could be provided throughout the school year to provide
foundational content and the in-person training could built upon the virtual content through
tabletop exercises. The literature indicates 15 to 30 minutes is the preferred length of time to
maintain engagement (Morgenroth, 2017). A module that is considerably longer could be
divided into shorter 15-minute lessons that support staff could access at school. Learner
convenience can mitigate some of the time constraints if it is presented as an option (Scott,
Feldman, & Underwood, 2016).
The school division subscribes to a learning management system that has the ability to
house training modules, assign and track completion, and provide training transcripts and
certificates of completion. The use of asynchronous learning is recognized by many employers
as a way to supplement education without requiring training venues, travel or significant time
(Rovai, 2002). Additionally, the use of virtual training is advantageous to mitigate the concerns
associated with COVID-19. During interviews, AP 1, AP 2, and Coordinator 1 all identified the
increase in virtual training due to pandemic related restrictions for teachers, which resulted in
being able to maintain continuity of operations.
Objective 2: identify topics complementary to behavioral threat assessment and
provide training. There are many training topics that complement behavioral threat assessment.
The literature indicates there are typically observable warning signs that indicate an individual
may require some level of intervention (National Threat Assessment Center, 2019). While some
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of these warning signs may be obvious, others are simply typical adolescent behavior (Storey,
Gibas, Reeves, & Hart, 2011). Training in topics such as adolescent brain development, Adverse
Childhood Experiences (ACEs), mental health, suicide awareness and the impact of trauma can
provide invaluable knowledge to identify and intervene in potentially harmful situations.
Goal 2: improve communication within the school community. Goal 2 is necessary
to create a culture of trust, awareness, and the reporting of concerning behaviors. The suggested
solutions to support this goal will require increased communication on threat assessment, sharing
the process for reporting a threat, and increasing opportunities for professional collaboration.
Objective 1: provide guidance to the school community on the recognition of
threatening or aberrant behavior and how to report a concern. Creating an authoritative
school climate that has high structure and high support may improve the reporting of concerns
(Cornell & Huang, 2016). Trust was identified as an important component by AP 1 and AP 2 in
the reporting of concerns to members of the threat assessment team. Threat assessment teams
are required by Virginia Code to “provide guidance to students, faculty, and staff regarding the
recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior that may result a threat to the community, school,
or self (DCJS, 2020, p. 17).
Secondary School Climate Survey for JDHS, the division, and the Commonwealth reveal
roughly half of teachers and staff are aware of a formal threat assessment process at their school.
This was consistent with the interview, focus group, and post-training survey findings. The first
step would be to ensure all school employees are aware of the threat assessment requirements
and options for reporting. The next step would be to inform parents through a newsletter or
email communication and explain not only the legal requirements, but also the importance of
threat assessment as an intervention to provide support. Finally, this information should be
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provided to students.

Objective 2: increase opportunities for collaboration between support staff, teachers,
and administrators. An unexpected finding was the sentiment communicated by support staff
during the focus group that they were perceived as less valuable to the school community. They
felt they were often not included in discussions, had limited opportunities for training, and “not
respected.” It would be expected that the implantation of goal 1 would increase the sense of
value to the school community. Additionally, support staff should be included in the school’s
professional learning communities (PLC) or have a channel to provide feedback and solicit
information. An option to address this would be an asynchronous virtual PLC composed of
teachers, support staff, and administration.
Resources Needed
Virginia public schools are fortunate to have significant resources, training, and technical
assistance available through the Virginia Center for School and Campus Safety at the Virginia
Department of Criminal Justice Services. This is all provided at no cost to public school
divisions and individual schools and divisions can request training for staff (Virginia Department
of Criminal Justice Services, n.d.). This school division did request and receive behavioral threat
assessment in 2019 from the DCJS, however, it did not include school staff beyond the required
threat assessment team members. Providing professional development to support staff is a
challenge due to limited availability outside of their hired role.
Support staff are hourly employees, and anything required for their job outside of their
contracted hours would require it to be reflected on their timesheets. Very few professional
development hours are built into support staff contracts and what does exist is required to meet
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job specific and/or state mandates. Perhaps, adding additional hours to their annual employment
contracts during the school year when students are not in session would provide training
opportunities. Of course, this would require adjusting annual contracts and reflecting the
increased costs in the budget. This school division does use a learning management system to
provide online training and all employees can access the training platform. Since this platform is
currently used by the division there would not be additional costs. The DCJS provides a threat
assessment curriculum, Model Policies document, a Basic K-12 Threat Assessment training, and
a train-the-trainer course at no cost to public school divisions in Virginia. Additionally, there are
training videos currently available at no cost that could be used to provide training to support
staff.
Funds Needed
Considering the Virginia DCJS provides training, technical assistance, and resources at
no cost to K-12 public schools in Virginia the need for funding would be limited to personnel
costs. If the current contract needed to be modified to provide training outside of the current
contract there would be increased costs based on the number of additional days added. It is
likely the schedule can be adjusted to provide more training without modifying the current
contracted hours. In the event there was an increase in contracted hours the additional costs
would need to be absorbed in the division’s personnel expenses.
Roles and Responsibilities
To increase threat assessment training for support staff and improve communication in
the school community, it is recommended the JDHS principal direct the threat assessment team
to assume responsibility for this initiative. The rationale behind this is based on the requirement
in Virginia Code that threat assessment teams provide that guidance to faculty, students, and
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staff. It would be most appropriate for the school administrator that serves on the JDHS threat
assessment team to lead this initiative and coordinate with the team, central officer, IT, and the
Threat Advisory Committee to ensure implementation of this initiative.
Timeline
To develop training for support staff the threat assessment team would establish an
advisory committee consisting of support staff that are representative of the various roles in the
school, an instructional and/or curriculum specialist, the SRO, and an additional threat
assessment team member. They would need to identify the trainings needed, find days and times
on the school calendar, and work with Information Technology (IT) to load training modules into
the division learning management system. The establishment of the advisory committee would
not only inform the process for providing training, but it would also provide a voice to support
staff and increase opportunities for collaboration.
The threat assessment team would work with the building principal to draft a parent
resource guide on threat assessment. This resource guide would ultimately be posted to the
school website and distributed by email to parents. The content in the guide would be informed
by the threat assessment advisory committee based on the DCJS Model Policies. Students would
be made aware of the importance of reporting a concern and how it can be reported at JDHS.
The timeline to establish these recommendations is as follows:
•

Prior to the start of the school year:
o identify employees to serve on the Threat Assessment Advisory Committee,
extend an invitation, and convene a meeting.
o share initiative goals and solicit feedback on training topics.
o select four microlessons (15 minutes) to be completed each quarter virtually.
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o select a minimum of two training dates and times to provide in-person training to
support staff.
o identify two tabletop training topics to occur during in-person training.
o draft a brief parent resource guide on threat assessment based on DCJS resources.
o create a virtual PLC composed of participants representative of teaching, support,
and administration.
•

First quarter:
o notify support staff of virtual quarterly training and in-person trainings.
o work with division IT to load virtual microlessons into the learning management
system.
o ensure all support staff have the appropriate credentials to access online training.
o

building principal, after receiving approval from the school division, will
disseminate the parent resource guide and post to the school website.

o quarterly microlesson.
o Begin asynchronous PLCs; ongoing.
•

Second quarter:
o conduct the first tabletop exercise at the end of the 2nd quarter to support the first
two quarterly microlessons.
o the Threat Assessment Advisory Committee will draft guidance on reporting a
threat or concern for students.
o student guidance will be shared by classroom teachers, posted in the school, and
made available on the school website.
o quarterly microlesson.
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•

Third quarter:
o review training evaluations from the first two quarterly microlessons and the first
semester in-person training. Adjust as needed.
o quarterly microlesson.

•

Fourth quarter:
o conduct second semester in-person training.
o quarterly microlesson.

•

Summer:
o Review evaluations and adjust based on feedback.
o identify complementary trainings to prepare for the next school year.
Solution Implications
The positive implications for solving the problem of inadequately trained support staff

are numerous and based on the literature and findings revealed in this research it is clear they
have the capacity to prevent harm. If a threat assessment team is able to avert a threat from
occurring due to the recognition of aberrant behavior by support staff, then the solution would
certainly see to be effective. However, the negative implications associated with threat
assessment in general can be difficult to overcome. When community members do not
understand threat assessment, they may perceive it as a process by schools to determine if there
is enough evidence to suspend. Therefore, communicating to the entire school community,
including parents, is crucial to gaining trust, increased reporting, and early intervention.
A potential negative implication of more training would be more threat assessments
conducted. It would be expected that if there was an increase in training to improve recognition
of aberrant behavior and the reporting of any concerning behaviors that there would also be an
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increase in threat assessment cases. On the surface, this increase in threat assessments would
seem to suggest students are engaging in more concerning behaviors. However, it would likely
suggest the capacity for recognition and reporting has improved, which would mean there is also
an increase in intervention and needed services.
The solution to the problem is primarily the provision of training. While support staff in
the focus group and survey indicated the desire for more training, there will certainly be people
that do not wish to receive training. Ideally, the suggested approach to providing this training
will allow for convenience, relevance, and an improved since of professional value. It is
important for administration to communicate the importance and relevance for the training in
order to create buy-in. Too often, trainings are conducted without the participants understanding
the purpose and merely become an additional task to be completed.
Considering the extensive free resources, training, and technical assistance offered by the
Virginia DCJS there should be minimal, to no, training expenses for the school or division. A
potential funding challenge, however, may exist if training hours cannot be identified within the
current support staff annual contracts. It is reasonable to assume that any additional training
efforts for support staff at JDHS on threat assessment would likely lead to it being replicated
across the division. While this is a positive implication, it would require a bit more oversight at
the division level to ensure consistency. JDHS could serve as a pilot location in year one, before
replicating the initiative in the remaining division high schools. Eventually, the division would
need to consider moving the initiative into middle school and then elementary school. If a
division wide practice was established, it could necessitate the need to establish school board
policies.
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Evaluation Plan
Determining the effectiveness of the proposed solution requires an evaluation of the
identified goals and objectives. There are multiple components that require evaluation since
there are many elements to the solution. The use of a post-training evaluation would be used to
assess if the training is engaging, increases knowledge, is relevant, and solicit suggestions for
improvements. The identification of specific training topics that would complement the threat
assessment process should be collected through staff surveys developed by JDHS. Every two
years a Secondary School Climate Survey is conducted, and a school specific report of the results
is provided. This report serves as an excellent source of information to identify student and staff
school climate perceptions, mental health concerns, and the prevalence of bullying. By
reviewing the Secondary School Climate report, the Threat Assessment Advisory Committee can
determine specific training needs. Additionally, the report can be compared to previous survey
administration to determine if there were perceived improvements.
Summary
This applied study identified four central themes that informed the suggestions for
solving the problem of inadequately trained support staff. These themes highlighted the need to
provide training to support staff that is relevant to their role and considerate of their time. There
are certainly challenges to providing training to support staff. This is not a unique problem at
JDHS; however, the literature suggests support staff have limited professional development due
to the structure of their contracts. Conducting a threat assessment by a multidisciplinary schoolbased team can only occur if a concern is brought to the team for consideration. The threat
assessment team typically receives the most relevant training, however, if only the team receives
the training, then there will be many potential serious threats that will go unnoticed.
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Support staff interact with the students beyond the classroom. The custodial staff are
familiar with the entire school and may see writing on a wall that is concerning. The office staff
interact with parents, community members, the staff, students and are often the first point of
contact with individuals entering the school. School security officers interact with students and
visitors to support the student code of conduct and patrol the campus. Paraprofessionals work
closely with special education students, which have a much higher incidence of concerning
behaviors compared to their non-disabled peers. Bus drivers are the first and last school
employee of the day to interact with students. They truly are the bookends of the school day and
they may observe the differences in the student that gets on the bus in the morning compared to
the one that gets on in the afternoon. Support staff can observe behavior outside of the
classroom that may be unknown to teachers and administration. Administrators, teachers, and
the threat assessment team would benefit from recognizing the important role support staff can
play in the recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior.
Schools are inundated with technology to prevent or respond to a threatening situation.
These include such devices as metal detectors, gunshot detection systems, 911 alert systems, and
ballistic doors. While some of these tools can have value it is important to consider their impact
on school climate. Do they create an environment that is conducive to learning, or do they evoke
the character of a prison? While those questions are certainly worthy of an additional study and
not the scope of this current study, what can be answered is they are often cost prohibitive,
limited in their scope of prevention, and are typically not called into use until a tragedy is
occurring. While a metal detector can detect a metallic object that may be concealed, it has zero
capacity to identify the student that has withdrawn from their peers. The metal detector will
never overhear a concerning or threatening statement. It will never read a statement of self-harm
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on the bathroom wall. It will never recognize a student that is exhibiting aberrant behavior that
is cause for concern. Most importantly, however, a metal detector will never build a positive
relationship with a student. Support staff are crucial to the school community and with training,
collaboration, and communication they can enhance the threat assessment process to intervene
with an individual that may be on the pathway to violence.
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APPENDIX A
James Christian
XXXXX XXXXXXX
Re: IRB Exemption - IRB-FY20-21-501 Recognizing Threatening and Aberrant Behavior: An Applied Study
to Develop Online Training for the Support Staff at John Doe High School
Dear James Christian, XXXXX XXXXXXX:
The Liberty University Institutional Review Board (IRB) has reviewed your application in accordance with
the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations
and finds your study to be exempt from further IRB review. This means you may begin your research
with the data safeguarding methods mentioned in your approved application, and no further IRB
oversight is required.
Your study falls under the following exemption category, which identifies specific situations in which
human participants research is exempt from the policy set forth in 45 CFR 46:
101(b):
Category 2.(iii). Research that only includes interactions involving educational tests (cognitive,
diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures, or observation of public
behavior (including visual or auditory recording) if at least one of the following criteria is met:
The information obtained is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that the identity of the
human subjects can readily be ascertained, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects, and an
IRB conducts a limited IRB review to make the determination required by §46.111(a)(7).
Your stamped consent form(s) and final versions of your study documents can be found under the
Attachments tab within the Submission Details section of your study on Cayuse IRB. Your stamped
consent form(s) should be copied and used to gain the consent of your research participants. If you plan
to provide your consent information electronically, the contents of the attached consent document(s)
should be made available without alteration.
Please note that this exemption only applies to your current research application, and any modifications
to your protocol must be reported to the Liberty University IRB for verification of continued exemption
status. You may report these changes by completing a modification submission through your Cayuse IRB
account.
If you have any questions about this exemption or need assistance in determining whether possible
modifications to your protocol would change your exemption status, please email us at irb@liberty.edu.
Sincerely,
X. XXXXXXX XXXXX, XX, XXX
Administrative Chair of Institutional Research
Research Ethics Office
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APPENDIX B
Consent for Threat Assessment Team Interview

Consent
Title of the Project: Recognizing Threatening and Aberrant Behavior: An Applied Study to
Develop Online Training for the Support Staff at John Doe High School
Principal Investigator: James D. Christian, Liberty University
Invitation to be Part of a Research Study
You are invited to participate in a research study. In order to participate, you must be 18 years of
age or older and a school division strict employee serving on your school’s behavioral threat
assessment team or a school resource officer employed by the local law enforcement agency and
assigned at the school through an memorandum of understanding. Taking part in this research
project is voluntary.
Please take time to read this entire form and ask questions before deciding whether to take part in
this research project.
What is the study about and why is it being done?

The purpose of the study is to develop an online training module aimed at increasing the
knowledge and awareness of behavioral threat assessment in support staff employees (i.e., bus
drivers, school security officers, instructional assistants, custodians, and office administrative
assistants). The goal is to increase the capacity of support staff to recognize threatening and/or
concerning behaviors and report it to the school’s behavioral threat assessment team for further
investigation.
What will happen if you take part in this study?

If you agree to be in this study, I would ask you to do the following things:
1. Participate in either an in-person or virtual interview. Interviews will be offered through a
virtual platform if requested. Social distancing and adherence to state and local guidelines
will be adhered to if an interview occurs in-person. Interviews should take approximately
one hour to complete. The interviews will be audio- and video-recorded if conducted
virtually or only audio-recorded if conducted in person. You will be provided a copy of
your interview transcript upon request to review for accuracy.
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How could you or others benefit from this study?

Participants should not expect to receive a direct benefit from taking part in this study.
Benefits to society could include improved identification of threatening and/or concerning
behaviors in the school community. This improvement could provide the opportunity to mitigate
and prevent acts of violence and provide support by increasing reporting to the threat assessment
team.
What risks might you experience from being in this study?

The risks involved in this study are minimal, which means they are equal to the risks you would
encounter in everyday life.
How will personal information be protected?

The records of this study will be kept private. Published reports will not include any information
that will make it possible to identify a subject. Research records will be stored securely, and only
the researcher will have access to the records.
• Participant responses will be kept confidential through the use of pseudonyms. Interviews
will be conducted in a location where others will not easily overhear the conversation.
• Data will be stored on a password-locked computer and may be used in future
presentations. After three years, all electronic records will be deleted.
• Interviews will be recorded and transcribed. Recordings will be stored on a password
locked computer for three years and then erased. Only the researcher will have access to
these recordings.
How will you be compensated for being part of the study?
Participants will not be compensated for participating in this study.
Is study participation voluntary?
Participation in this study is voluntary. Your decision whether to participate will not affect your
current or future relations with Liberty University or with XXXXXXXXX XXXXXX
XXXXXXX. If you decide to participate, you are free to not answer any question or withdraw at
any time without affecting those relationships.
What should you do if you decide to withdraw from the study?
If you choose to withdraw from the study, please contact the researcher at the phone number or
email address included in the next paragraph. Should you choose to withdraw, data collected
from you will be destroyed immediately and will not be included in this study.
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Whom do you contact if you have questions or concerns about the study?
The researcher conducting this study is James D. Christian. You may ask any questions you have
now. If you have questions later, you are encouraged to contact him at XXX-XXX-XXXX or
XXXXXXXXX. You may also contact the researcher’s faculty sponsor,
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Whom do you contact if you have questions about your rights as a research participant?
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study and would like to talk to someone
other than the researcher, you are encouraged to contact the Institutional Review Board, 1971
University Blvd., Green Hall Ste. 2845, Lynchburg, VA 24515 or email at irb@liberty.edu.
Your Consent
By signing this document, you are agreeing to be in this study. Make sure you understand what
the study is about before you sign. You will be given a copy of this document for your records.
The researcher will keep a copy with the study records. If you have any questions about the
study after you sign this document, you can contact the researcher using the information
provided above.
I have read and understood the above information. I have asked questions and have received
answers. I consent to participate in the study.
The researcher has my permission to audio-record/video-record me as part of my participation
in this study.
____________________________________
Printed Subject Name

____________________________________
Signature & Date
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APPENDIX C
Consent for Support Staff Focus Group

Consent
Title of the Project: Recognizing Threatening and Aberrant Behavior: An Applied Study to
Develop Online Training for the Support Staff at John Doe High School
Principal Investigator: James D. Christian, Liberty University
Invitation to be Part of a Research Study
You are invited to participate in a research study. In order to participate, you must be 18 years of
age or older and a school division employee serving at your school in the one of the following
roles/positions: school security officer, office staff, paraprofessional, bus driver, or custodial
staff. Paraprofessionals will be defined as instructional support staff that support special
education teachers by working with students with disabilities for this study. Office staff includes
administrative assistants, attendance clerks, bookkeepers, and other office staff positions. Taking
part in this research project is voluntary.
Please take time to read this entire form and ask questions before deciding whether to take part in
this research project.
What is the study about and why is it being done?

The purpose of the study is to develop an online training module aimed at increasing the
knowledge and awareness of behavioral threat assessment in support staff employees (i.e., bus
drivers, school security officers, instructional assistants, custodians, and office administrative
assistants). The goal is to increase the capacity of support staff to recognize threatening and/or
concerning behaviors and report it to the school’s behavioral threat assessment team for further
investigation.
What will happen if you take part in this study?

If you agree to be in this study, I would ask you to do the following things:
1. Participate in a focus group using an online meeting room, such as Zoom, WebEx, or
Google Meet. The focus group will take approximately 1 hour to complete and will be
audio- and video-recorded.

154
How could you or others benefit from this study?

Participants should not expect to receive a direct benefit from taking part in this study.
Benefits to society could include improved identification of threatening and/or concerning
behaviors in the school community. This improvement could provide the opportunity to mitigate
and prevent acts of violence and provide support by increasing reporting to the threat assessment
team.
What risks might you experience from being in this study?

The risks involved in this study are minimal, which means they are equal to the risks you would
encounter in everyday life.
How will personal information be protected?

The records of this study will be kept private. Published reports will not include any information
that will make it possible to identify a subject. Research records will be stored securely, and only
the researcher will have access to the records.
• Participant responses will be kept confidential through the use of pseudonyms. The focus
group will be conducted in a location where others will not easily overhear the
conversation.
• Data will be stored on a password-locked computer and in a locked cabinet. The data may
be used in future presentations. After three years, all electronic records will be deleted
and all physical records will be shredded.
• The focus group will be recorded and transcribed. Recordings will be stored on a
password locked computer for three years and then erased. Only the researcher will have
access to these recordings.
• Confidentiality cannot be guaranteed in focus group settings. While discouraged, other
members of the focus group may share what was discussed with persons outside of the
group.
How will you be compensated for being part of the study?
Participants will not be compensated for participating in this study.
Is study participation voluntary?
Participation in this study is voluntary. Your decision whether to participate will not affect your
current or future relations with Liberty University or with XXXXXXXXXX XXXXX
XXXXXXX. If you decide to participate, you are free to not answer any question or withdraw at
any time without affecting those relationships.
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What should you do if you decide to withdraw from the study?
If you choose to withdraw from the study, please contact the researcher at the phone number or
email address included in the next paragraph. Should you choose to withdraw, data collected
from you, apart from focus group data, will be destroyed immediately and will not be included in
this study. Focus group data will not be destroyed, but your contributions to the focus group will
not be included in the study if you choose to withdraw.
Whom do you contact if you have questions or concerns about the study?
The researcher conducting this study is James D. Christian. You may ask any questions you have
now. If you have questions later, you are encouraged to contact him at XXX-XXX-XXXX or
XXXXXXXXXXX. You may also contact the researcher’s faculty sponsor, XXXXXXXXXX
Whom do you contact if you have questions about your rights as a research participant?
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study and would like to talk to someone
other than the researcher, you are encouraged to contact the Institutional Review Board, 1971
University Blvd., Green Hall Ste. 2845, Lynchburg, VA 24515 or email at irb@liberty.edu.
Your Consent
By signing this document, you are agreeing to be in this study. Make sure you understand what
the study is about before you sign. You will be given a copy of this document for your records.
The researcher will keep a copy with the study records. If you have any questions about the study
after you sign this document, you can contact the researcher using the information provided
above.
I have read and understood the above information. I have asked questions and have received
answers. I consent to participate in the study.
The researcher has my permission to audio- and video-record me as part of my participation
in this study.
____________________________________
Printed Subject Name

____________________________________
Signature & Date

156
APPENDIX D
Consent for Support Staff Post-Training Survey
Title of the Project: Recognizing Threatening and Aberrant Behavior: An Applied Study to
Develop Online Training for the Support Staff at John Doe High
School
Principal Investigator: James D. Christian, Liberty University
Invitation to be Part of a Research Study
You are invited to participate in a research study. In order to participate, you must
be 18 years of age or older and a school division employee serving at your school in
the one of the following roles/positions: school security officer, office staff,
paraprofessional, bus driver, or custodial staff. Paraprofessionals will be defined as
instructional support staff that support special education teachers by working with
students with disabilities for this study. Office staff includes administrative
assistants, attendance clerks, bookkeepers, and other office staff positions. Taking
part in this research project is voluntary.
Please take time to read this entire form and ask questions before deciding whether
to take part in this research project.
What is the study about and why is it being done?

The purpose of the study is to develop an online training module aimed at increasing
the knowledge and awareness of behavioral threat assessment in support staff
employees (i.e., bus drivers, school security officers, instructional assistants,
custodians, and office administrative assistants). The goal is to increase the capacity
of support staff to recognize threatening and/or concerning behaviors and report it to
the school’s behavioral threat assessment team for further investigation.

Liberty University
IRB-FY20-21-501
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What will happen if you take part in this study?

If you agree to be in this study, I would ask you to do the following things:
1. Participate in a brief (15 minutes) online training module about recognizing
and reporting concerning behaviors and/or threats to your administration.
The online training module will be accessed online and will not require you
to take a test to measure what you have learned.
2. After you complete the online training module, you will complete a short
survey (10 minutes) to share your opinion about whether you feel it
improved your ability to recognize and report concerning behaviors and/or
threats. The survey will be accessible online through a link that will be on
the final slide of the training. Clicking on that link will take you to an online
survey platform.
How could you or others benefit from this study?

The direct benefit participants should expect to receive from taking part in this study
is an improved threat assessment awareness and recognition ability.
Benefits to society could include improved identification of threatening and/or
concerning behaviors in the school community. This improvement could provide the
opportunity to mitigate and prevent acts of violence and provide support by
increasing reporting to the threat assessment team.
What risks might you experience from being in this study?

The risks involved in this study are minimal, which means they are equal to the risks
you would encounter in everyday life.
How will personal information be protected?

The records of this study will be kept private. Research records will be stored
securely, and only the researcher will have access to the records.
• Participant responses will be anonymous.
• Data will be stored on a password-locked computer and in a locked cabinet.
The data may be used in future presentations. After three years, all electronic
records will be deleted and all physical records will be shredded.
How will you be compensated for being part of the study?
Participants will be not be compensated for participating in this study.
Liberty University
IRB-FY20-21-501
Approved on 4-14-2021
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Is study participation voluntary?
Participation in this study is voluntary. Your decision whether to participate will not
affect your current or future relations with Liberty University or with XXXXXXXX.
If you decide to participate, you are free to not answer any question or withdraw at
any time prior to submitting the survey without affecting those relationships.
What should you do if you decide to withdraw from the study?
If you choose to withdraw from the study, please exit the survey and close your
internet browser. Your responses will not be recorded or included in this study.
Whom do you contact if you have questions or concerns about the study?
The researcher conducting this study is James D. Christian. You may ask any
questions you have now. If you have questions later, you are encouraged to contact
him at XXXXXXXX or XXXXXXXXX. You may also contact the researcher’s
faculty sponsor, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.
Whom do you contact if you have questions about your rights as a research participant?
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study and would like to talk to
someone other than the researcher, you are encouraged to contact the Institutional
Review Board, 1971 University Blvd., Green Hall Ste. 2845, Lynchburg, VA 24515
or email at irb@liberty.edu.
Your Consent
Before agreeing to be part of the research, please be sure that you understand what
the study is about. You can print a copy of the document for your records. If you
have any questions about the study later, you can contact the researcher using the
information provided above.

Liberty University
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APPENDIX E
Interview Questions
1.

What is your current position and title?

2. How many years have you worked in this school division?
a. How many years have you worked at this school?
3. How many years have you worked in the field of education?
4. On average, how often does your threat assessment team meet per school year for the
purpose of assessing a threat to self or others?
5. A threat assessment team is required by Virginia Code to be composed of expertise in
administration, counseling, instruction, and law enforcement. Who typically fulfills that
requirement on your threat assessment team at this school?
6. Describe all of the formal and informal threat assessment training you have received?
7. Describe any additional training that complements your role as a threat assessment team
member.
8. When gathering information for assessing a threat, please describe who you consulted
about what they may have observed or heard? Please use the best role or title to describe
them.
9. How many hours on average per year do the following support staff receive professional
development?
a. School security officers
b. Bus drivers
c. Front office staff
d. Paraprofessionals
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e. Custodians
10. How is professional development delivered to support staff?
11. What type of training do teachers outside of the threat assessment team receive on the
role of a threat assessment team, recognition of threatening or aberrant behavior, or how
to report a threat?
a. How about support staff? This includes bus drivers, front office staff, school
security officers, custodial staff, and paraprofessionals.
b. Can you briefly describe the training? (length of training, frequency, structured,
etc…)
12. How does the school track online training that is completed by school personnel?
13. How do staff report a concern about an individual that is demonstrating possible
threatening or aberrant behavior?
a. Who do they report that information to?
14. How many years have you been assigned to the role of SRO in this school division?
a. How many years have you been assigned to this school?
15. How many years have you worked in law enforcement?
16. Prior to your assignment as an SRO, what was your previous role?
17. Please describe the training you received in preparation for your role as an SRO.
a. Who provided the training and in what year?
18. Please describe any formal behavioral threat assessment training you have received.
a. Who provided the training and in what year?
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19. Please describe how you receive reports from the school community regarding
threatening or aberrant behavior that is ultimately addressed through the threat
assessment team?
a. Please describe the roles, titles, or positions of the individuals that have reported a
threat to you that is either directed towards someone in the school community or
themselves.
20. Describe current practices for providing professional development for support staff
within the division.
21. How many professional development hours, on average, do support staff receive per
school year?
22. What training topics do support staff receive? Describe using the following:
a. By role: school security officer, front office staff, paraprofessional, custodian, bus
driver
b. Upon hiring
c. Periodically
23. What training modality is used to provide training (i.e., online platform, in-person,
other)?
24. How many hours are allocated in support staff contracts specific for professional
development?
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APPENDIX F
Focus Group Questions for Guided Discussion
1. Describe what may be considered a threat to your school community.
2. What do you believe to be the biggest challenge to identifying if someone is a threat?
3. Considering some of the examples you gave, how might you proceed in reporting what
you saw or heard?
4. In your opinion, in what ways could your school improve your knowledge of identifying
threatening behavior?
5. When considering training, what is the best format for you to learn? Do you prefer online
modules, in-person workshops, tabletop exercises, or something else?
6. In what ways does staff in your school understand the goals of threat assessment and how
to reports any concerns?
7. Describe the threat assessments conducted during this school year or any other during
your time at this school? This includes frequency, type of threats, possible outcomes.
8. Describe the type of threat assessment training you have received in the recognition of
behavior that may cause concern or seem to be threatening to someone else or to
themselves? When did you receive the training and who provided it?
9. Do you feel training and/or guidance in how to recognize and report threats would be
useful to preventing violence towards others or self?
10. If you were aware of a threat to self or others who would you tell, or how would you
report it?
**Additional questions will occur as the discussion organically evolves around the answers
provided by members of the focus group.
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APPENDIX G
Survey Questions
Background Questions
1. Which job title best describes your current role?
a. school security officer
b. bus driver
c. paraprofessional/instruction assistant
d. office staff
e. custodial staff
2. How many years have you worked in this school division?
3. How many years have you worked at this school?
4. Prior to this training, have you ever received behavioral threat assessment training?
5. Prior to this training, were you aware of the requirement for threat assessment teams?
Perception Questions
1. This training improved my awareness of the requirement for threat assessment teams in
Virginia schools.
a. Strongly disagree
b. Disagree
c. Neutral
d. Agree
e. Strongly agree
2. This training is important for my role at the school.
a. Strongly disagree
b. Disagree
c. Neutral
d. Agree
e. Strongly agree
3. After completing this training, I realize that I have observed or heard something at school
in the past that may have been threatening or aberrant behavior.
a. Strongly disagree
b. Disagree
c. Neutral
d. Agree
e. Strongly agree
4. After completing this training, I feel better prepared to recognize threatening or aberrant
behavior.
a. Strongly disagree
b. Disagree
c. Neutral
d. Agree
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e. Strongly agree
5. If I had a concern about a student or another individual in the school community, I would
know how to report it at my school.
a. Strongly disagree
b. Disagree
c. Neutral
d. Agree
e. Strongly agree
6. After completing this training, I feel more confident of when to report threatening or
aberrant behavior.
a. Strongly disagree
b. Disagree
c. Neutral
d. Agree
e. Strongly agree
7. I am comfortable in reporting threatening or aberrant behavior at my school.
a. Strongly disagree
b. Disagree
c. Neutral
d. Agree
e. Strongly agree
8. The length of the training was appropriate.
a. Strongly disagree
b. Disagree
c. Neutral
d. Agree
e. Strongly agree
9. I would prefer to receive this training online instead of in-person.
a. Strongly disagree
b. Disagree
c. Neutral
d. Agree
e. Strongly agree
10. This online training module was easy to understand.
a. Strongly disagree
b. Disagree
c. Neutral
d. Agree
e. Strongly agree
11. I believe all support staff should receive this training.
a. Strongly disagree
b. Disagree
c. Neutral
d. Agree
e. Strongly agree
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12. The use of scenarios in this training helped me to understand threatening or aberrant
behavior.
a. Strongly disagree
b. Disagree
c. Neutral
d. Agree
e. Strongly agree
13. I would like to learn more about behavioral threat assessment.
a. Strongly disagree
b. Disagree
c. Neutral
d. Agree
e. Strongly agree
14. This training makes me feel like a valuable part of my school community.
a. Strongly disagree
b. Disagree
c. Neutral
d. Agree
e. Strongly agree

166
APPENDIX H
Request to Conduct Research
On November 11, 2020, the researcher submitted a request to conduct research to the
preferred school division. This was accomplished through a completing a school division form
and included information regarding problem, purpose, methodology, population, data collection,
and survey instruments. Formal permission was granted on December 1, 2020 through a letter
that was provided to the researcher. This letter is provided in Appendix H and has been redacted
to maintain confidentiality.
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APPENDIX I
Approval Letter

